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ARTICLE 
THE INTERIOR STRUCTURE OF IMMIGRATION 
ENFORCEMENT 
EISHA JAIN† 
Deportation dominates immigration policy debates, yet it amounts to a fraction 
of the work the immigration enforcement system does. This Article maps the interior 
structure of immigration enforcement, and it seeks to show how attention to its 
structure oﬀers both practical and conceptual payoﬀs for contemporary enforcement 
debates. First, deportation should not be conceptualized as synonymous with 
immigration enforcement; rather, it is merely the tip of a much larger enforcement 
pyramid. At the pyramid’s base, immigration enforcement operates through a host of 
initiatives that build immigration screening into common interactions, such as with 
police and employers. Second, this enforcement structure has far-reaching hidden 
costs. Scholars have recognized some of these costs, such as the exploitation of 
undocumented noncitizens. Yet the full cost of this enforcement structure goes deeper. 
Beyond enabling exploitative actors, it leaves little room for good faith actors to 
incentivize socially valuable behavior. In its impact, immigration enforcement bears 
unappreciated structural similarities to certain low-level criminal law enforcement 
techniques, where a large population is likewise subject to ubiquitous monitoring by 
public and private actors alike. As important criminal law and sociological literature 
shows, this enforcement structure can carry far-reaching costs for society at large. It 
can create system avoidance (where the regulated population avoids contact with key 
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legal institutions) and law enforcement tradeoﬀs (where eﬀorts to enforce one law 
result in underenforcement of other laws). This Article applies structural insights from 
low-level criminal law enforcement to immigration enforcement to assess the costs of 
monitoring an undocumented population long-term. It calls for restructuring 
immigration enforcement to consider the full impact of interior enforcement in light 
of those who remain present in the United States long term. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Deportation dominates immigration policy debates, yet it represents a 
fraction of the work the immigration enforcement system does. In recent 
years, federal immigration authorities have carried out three to four hundred 
thousand removals annually.1 The numbers are staggering on a historic scale, 
but they amount to no more than three to four percent of the estimated 
population of eleven million undocumented migrants.2 The vast majority of 
the undocumented population remains present long-term, with the median 
 
1 U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF’T, FISCAL YEAR 2016 ICE ENFORCEMENT AND 
REMOVALS REPORT 2 (2016) 
https://www.ice.gov/sites/default/ﬁles/documents/Report/2016/removal-stats-2016.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/YMG3-CQ34] (showing that annual removals in the past ten years ranged from 
approximately 235,000 to 400,000 removals per year). 
2 JEFFREY S. PASSEL & D’VERA COHN, OVERALL NUMBER OF U.S. UNAUTHORIZED 
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length of residence being about fourteen years.3 Less than ﬁfteen percent 
have been present for under ﬁve years.4 
Given these figures, deportation plays an outsized role in immigration 
policy debates.5 Equating immigration enforcement with deportation obscures 
much of the interior work that the immigration enforcement system does. At 
worst, it lends fodder to the argument that the immigration enforcement 
system is simply not doing much work.6 It is akin to trying to understand the 
whole of the criminal justice system from the perspective of capital cases. 
A large literature explores how immigration enforcement has absorbed the 
enforcement norms of criminal law.7 This scholarship is valuable precisely 
because it illustrates the erosion of the doctrinal boundaries between 
immigration and criminal law. Yet to the extent scholarship compares 
deportation to criminal punishment, it presents an incomplete portrait of both 
systems. Just as immigration enforcement does far more than impose 
deportation, criminal law enforcement reaches well beyond formal punishment. 
The vast majority of people who experience contact with the criminal justice 
system do so through low-level arrests, where there is no hefty prison sentence. 
Rather, they experience other penalties, such as probation, jail time, fines, lost 
work, or other collateral penalties that can be triggered from a mere arrest, even 
without a conviction. Incarceration is not the sum total of what the criminal 
justice system does; it is merely the top of the “penal pyramid.” 8 
 
3 Id. at 7. 
4 See id. at 6 (using data from 2014 to arrive at this percentage). 
5 This Article uses the statutory term “removal” interchangeably with “deportation.” 
6 See, e.g., Kris W. Kobach, Attrition Through Enforcement: A Rational Approach to Illegal 
Immigration, 15 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 155, 156 (2008) (arguing that immigration policy does 
“virtually nothing to enforce the law against garden-variety illegal aliens” and that “most illegal 
aliens have never faced a serious threat of enforcement”); Joseph Tanfani, Atty. Gen. Sessions Says 
Lax Immigration Enforcement Is Enabling Gangs Like MS-13, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 18, 2017), 
https://www.latimes.com/politics/washington/la-na-essential-washington-updates-sessions-says-
lax-immigration-1492527375-htmlstory.html (describing immigration enforcement as lax for not 
engaging in suﬃcient deportation). 
7 The literature is far too voluminous to catalogue here. For selected contributions, see generally, 
Jennifer M. Chacón, Managing Migration Through Crime, 109 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 135 (2009); 
Ingrid V. Eagly, Prosecuting Immigration, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1281 (2010); Daniel 
Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, and Punishment: Some Thoughts About Why Hard Laws Make 
Bad Cases, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1890 (2000); Teresa A. Miller, Citizenship & Severity: Recent Immigration 
Reforms and the New Penology, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 611 (2003); David Alan Sklansky, Crime, 
Immigration, and Ad Hoc Instrumentalism, 15 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 157 (2012); Juliet Stumpf, The 
Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 367 (2006). 
8 In employing this heuristic, I am indebted to Alexandra Natapoﬀ ’s insightful scholarship on 
the “penal pyramid.” Alexandra Natapoﬀ, The Penal Pyramid, in THE NEW CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
THINKING 79 (Sharon Dolovich & Alexandra Natapoﬀ eds., 2017). Natapoﬀ ’s work criticizes the 
dominance of felonies in criminal law scholarship and conceptualizes misdemeanors as the “base” of 
the criminal justice system. Id. 
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This Article argues that even as immigration enforcement has absorbed the 
enforcement norms of federal criminal prosecution, it has also absorbed 
surveillance and “managerial” techniques—namely, techniques for monitoring, 
tracking, and conducting risk assessment on large groups over time—from the 
low-level criminal law context. In comparing certain low-level criminal law 
enforcement and immigration enforcement, this Article makes two contributions 
to immigration enforcement debates. First, it argues that immigration 
enforcement should not be conceptualized as synonymous with deportation; 
rather, deportation is merely the tip of a much larger enforcement pyramid. 
Scholars have explored the interconnections between the tips of the “penal 
pyramid” and the immigration enforcement pyramid by showing how 
deportation is imposed in ways that increasingly resemble criminal punishment.9 
But they have yet to examine structural similarities at the base of both pyramids, 
where a large population is subject to ongoing monitoring. This Article begins to 
fill that gap. Second, it argues that similar to the misdemeanor context, 
policymakers have failed to appreciate the hidden costs of monitoring a 
population in the long term and creating the ubiquitous possibility of escalated 
enforcement. A large and compelling body of literature documents how 
immigration enforcement techniques may create vulnerability to bad or 
unscrupulous actors, such as those who engage in wage theft or abuse.10 Yet the 
real impact of this enforcement system goes deeper. It leaves little room for good 
faith actors—those who do not seek to exploit vulnerable populations—to 
encourage socially desirable interactions. Appreciating this cost is necessary for 
understanding the full reach of immigration enforcement. It also suggests that 
the costs of this enforcement approach are not entirely unique to the immigration 
context. Rather, they are also partially the product of an enforcement structure 
that gives a host of actors the power to trigger escalated enforcement. 
Immigration enforcement operates in the interior by delegating 
enforcement discretion to many actors, both public and private. Police oﬃcers 
or employers, for instance, function as so-called “force multipliers” who are 
supposed to engage in immigration enforcement while undertaking their 
normal duties.11 In taking this approach, immigration enforcement borrows a 
 
9 See id. at 72-73 (discussing how misdemeanors constitute the base of the “penal pyramid” 
while felonies constitute the top and noting that the vast majority of criminal defendants experience 
the criminal justice system through misdemeanors rather than felonies). 
10 See, e.g., Elizabeth Fussell, The Deportation Threat Dynamic and Victimization of Latino 
Migrants: Wage Theft and Robbery, 52 SOC. Q. 593, 601-604 (2011) (noting that Latino laborers in 
New Orleans, Louisiana, from 2007 to 2008, of whom an estimated ninety percent were 
undocumented, reported widespread wage theft). 
11 See Kris W. Kobach, The Quintessential Force Multiplier: The Inherent Authority of Local Police 
to Make Immigration Arrests, 69 ALB. L. REV. 179, 181 (2005) (articulating the argument that police 
ought to be used as immigration “force multipliers” to engage in interior immigration enforcement 
and widen the enforcement “net”). 
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strategy from low-level criminal law enforcement. Employers, for instance, 
function as de facto probation oﬃcers when they monitor compliance with 
work requirements for probationers. In thousands of homes that are subject 
to “nuisance” ordinances around the country, landlords are required to 
monitor tenants and to evict those the police suspect of causing 
disturbances.12 In both the criminal law and immigration context, such 
initiatives are viewed as a low-cost way to achieve enforcement objectives. 
Yet taking this approach to enforcement imposes hidden costs. As criminal law 
scholars have recognized, for one, some populations are unlikely to be deterred. 
Some addicts, for instance, respond to drug enforcement crackdowns by engaging 
in riskier behavior to avoid getting caught.13 Attempts at enforcement can trigger 
law enforcement tradeoffs: They can come at the expense of enforcing other laws, 
such as wage and hour laws. They can also lead to “system avoidance,” when the 
regulated population avoids contact with key formal legal institutions to avoid 
perceived surveillance and resulting enforcement actions.14 The volume of 
undocumented migrants living in the United States long term demonstrates how 
enforcement efforts are unable to meet their stated objectives. And efforts to 
engage in ever-broader, ever-cheaper enforcement tactics are likely to create 
significant costs for society at large, such as through system avoidance and law 
enforcement tradeoffs. In taking this approach, interior immigration has 
replicated some of the flawed assumptions behind low-level criminal enforcement, 
particularly in overlooking the full costs of this approach. 
Understanding the reach of immigration enforcement and its impact has 
taken on new urgency in recent years. One rationale for the Trump 
administration’s crackdown on illegal immigration is simple deterrence: the 
theory is that high-profile acts of enforcement along with a stated “zero tolerance” 
approach will make a significant dent in the population of eleven million 
unauthorized migrants who are already present.15 This Article shows why this 
 
12 See infra Part III for a discussion of these policies. 
13 See, e.g., Josh Bowers, Contraindicated Drug Courts, 55 UCLA L. REV. 783, 786 (2008) (explaining 
why drug courts adopt a flawed strategy by using penal techniques to motivate therapeutic behavior); 
Jessica M. Eaglin, The Drug Court Paradigm, 53 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 595, 635 (2016) (discussing how 
drug courts may not change underlying behavior); Barbara Fedders, Opioid Policing, 94 IND. L.J. 389, 
404-09 (2019) (discussing the costs of criminalizing opioid use). 
14 See Sarah Brayne, Surveillance and System Avoidance: Criminal Justice Contact and Institutional 
Attachment, 79 AM. SOC. REV. 367, 368 (2014) (“[T]he potential of surveillance may lead to lower 
levels of involvement in institutions that keep formal records . . . .”). 
15 Deterrence is not the only rationale; as others have developed, the policy changes also reﬂect 
obvious racial animus. See, e.g., Michelle Ye Hee Lee, Donald Trump’s False Comments Connecting 
Mexican Immigrants and Crime, WASH. POST (July 8, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2015/07/08/donald-trumps-false-
comments-connecting-mexican-immigrants-and-crime/?utm_term=.d335acee161d 
[https://perma.cc/77BG-7RBU] (reporting that as a presidential candidate, Donald Trump described 
Mexican migrants as “in many cases, criminals, drug dealers, rapists, etc.”); Laura Meckler & 
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theory of deterrence is oversimplified. It overlooks systemic costs of attempting 
to achieve deterrence, particularly costs associated with delegating enforcement 
discretion to actors other than federal immigration enforcement authorities. 
Undocumented migrants who remain in the United States are not merely 
aware of the possibility that one day ICE may come knocking at their door. 
Rather, they have reason to perceive routine interactions with key 
institutions—employers, police, and others—as potential triggers for 
detention, deportation, or other penalties. This awareness, in turn, creates 
incentives to engage in system avoidance—to lay low, avoid reporting crime, 
or avoid reporting unsafe working conditions. Awareness of surveillance 
reorders relationships; it puts some in a position of power relative to others. 
Employers, for instance, are not merely employers. Because they routinely 
conduct immigration screening,16 they have the ability to credibly threaten to 
trigger arrest, detention, or deportation. This raises the stakes of routine 
interactions between undocumented workers and employers. Similar 
dynamics unfold with others who exercise de facto immigration enforcement 
power, such as police.17 
Incentives to lay low exist even when employers or police themselves 
encourage open communication, offer fair working conditions, or otherwise 
encourage socially valuable interactions. This Article seeks to apply insights from 
criminal law enforcement to evaluating how immigration enforcement decisions 
affect the vast majority of undocumented migrants who remain within the United 
 
Siobhan Hughes, Immigration Talks Muddled Amid Trump’s Vulgar Comments, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 11, 
2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/lawmakers-look-to-sell-immigration-deal-to-a-skeptical-white-
house-1515700909 (reporting that the President referred to Haitian and African immigrants as 
coming from “shithole countries” and expressed a desire for more immigrants from countries like 
Norway). My focus is structural not because the racism in immigration enforcement is unimportant 
but rather because it has eloquently been discussed elsewhere. See, e.g., Jayashri Srikantiah & Shirin 
Sinnar, White Nationalism as Immigration Policy, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 197, 198-200 (2019) 
(oﬀering multiple examples of President Trump denigrating nonwhite immigrants in racial terms). 
In addition, while openly racialized rhetoric from a sitting president is deeply troubling, it is not an 
entirely new development; immigration law has long reﬂected racial biases. See, e.g., Kari Hong, The 
Absurdity of Crime-Based Deportation, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 2067, 2071 (2017) (“The belief that 
immigrants are crossing the border, in the stealth of night, with nefarious desires to bring violence, 
crime, and drugs to the United States has long been part of the public imagination.”); Charles J. 
Ogletree, Jr., America’s Schizophrenic Immigration Policy: Race, Class, and Reason, 41 B.C. L. REV. 755, 
761 (2000) (describing country caps as an example of racial biases that pervade legal immigration). 
16 See Stephen Lee, Private Immigration Screening in the Workplace, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1103, 1104-05 
(2009) (conceptualizing private employers as “one particularly problematic set of immigration 
screeners” given that they check immigration status and have the ability to report undocumented 
workers who organize). For a discussion of the mechanics of employer screening, see infra Part II. 
17 Stephen Lee, De Facto Immigration Courts, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 553, 559-71 (2013) 
(conceptualizing prosecutors as “de facto immigration courts” because they exercise functional power 
over deportation by deciding whether to bring pleas that will trigger deportation). 
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States.18 It evaluates procedural reforms and “sanctuary” policies, and it considers 
how to more fully assess the costs of the current enforcement structure. 
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I briefly summarizes the literature 
comparing deportation to criminal punishment. Part II explains why 
deportation should be conceptualized as the tip of a larger enforcement 
pyramid. Part III shows how immigration enforcement bears important 
structural parallels to low-level criminal law enforcement techniques. Both 
operate by delegating enforcement discretion to public and private actors, and 
both carry the potential for high-stakes outcomes. It then discusses the costs 
of seeking to surveil and to sporadically enforce laws against a long-term 
undocumented population. Part IV considers how attention to the structure of 
immigration enforcement may affect contemporary immigration enforcement 
debates. In particular, it calls for recognizing the limits of proceduralist 
arguments in immigration enforcement, and it evaluates the limits of 
“sanctuary” policies in criminal justice. It also considers how to more fully 
evaluate the costs of immigration enforcement in the absence of a legalization 
program targeted toward the long-term undocumented population. 
I. THE DEPORTATION-DOMINANT ACCOUNT 
Immigration expansionists and restrictionists alike use removals as the most 
important benchmark for understanding the reach of immigration enforcement.19 
There are good reasons for this approach: deportation may be experienced as 
punishment and imposed without adequate procedural constraints. This Part 
briefly summarizes the key contributions of the deportation-centric approach, 
including its comparison to punishment. Part II then turns to how interior 
immigration enforcement is far broader than the act of removal. 
As immigration scholars have highlighted, deportation can function as an 
extraordinarily harsh penalty, one that the U.S. Supreme Court has 
characterized as resulting in “the loss of all that makes life worth living.”20 
Notwithstanding its civil label, deportation may be experienced as punitive, 
 
18 While this Article focuses on undocumented migrants, it is important to note that many of 
the arguments apply to those with various forms of legal status as well. See infra Part II. 
19 See, e.g., Julia Preston, Record Number of Foreigners Were Deported in 2011, Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 7, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/08/us/us-deports-record-number-of-foreigners-in-
2011.html [https://perma.cc/TK99-ERHD] (discussing deportations at an “all-time high” under President 
Obama); Amy B. Wang, Donald Trump Plans to Immediately Deport 2 Million to 3 Million Undocumented 
Immigrants, WASH. POST (Nov. 14, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
fix/wp/2016/11/13/donald-trump-plans-to-immediately-deport-2-to-3-million-undocumented-
immigrants/?utm_term=.1a195cd655dc [http://perma.cc/YYB9-TSAZ] (quoting President-elect Donald 
Trump as stating, “a lot of these people, probably 2 million, it could be even 3 million, we are [going to 
get] them out of our country”). 
20 Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 147 (1945) (quoting Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 
284 (1922)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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particularly when long-term residents are removed to dangerous countries 
with which they have no remaining ties.21 
Deportation is now routinely linked to criminal punishment. In 1996, 
Congress vastly expanded the types of crimes that trigger mandatory 
deportation.22 Six years prior, Congress had also removed a form of discretion 
that had previously enabled sentencing judges to halt deportation on 
equitable grounds.23 These statutory changes made many long-term lawful 
permanent residents with dated or minor convictions subject to 
deportation.24 Given the absence of time limitations on removal, groups such 
as “Dreamers” who entered unlawfully as children and have never lived 
elsewhere are subject to deportation at any time.25 
Immigration scholars have shown how deportation decisions are deeply 
enmeshed with the criminal process.26 Immigration cases not only dominate 
the workload of federal prosecutors; they have eclipsed every other area of 
prosecution.27 The criminal and immigration enforcement systems are 
 
21 See, e.g., Brief for Asian American Justice Center et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioner at 14-22, Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010) (No. 08-651), 2009 WL 1567358 
(discussing long-term unauthorized residents who were deported after minor oﬀenses). 
22 See Nancy Morawetz, Understanding the Impact of the 1996 Deportation Laws and the Limited 
Scope of Proposed Reforms, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1936, 1936 (2000) (discussing how the Antiterrorism 
and Eﬀective Death Penalty Act and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility 
Act “drastically changed the consequences of criminal convictions for lawful permanent residents”). 
23 See Padilla, 559 U.S. at 361-62 (“This procedure, known as a judicial recommendation against 
deportation, or JRAD, had the eﬀect of binding the Executive to prevent deportation; the statute 
was consistently . . . interpreted as giving the sentencing judge conclusive authority to decide 
whether a particular conviction should be disregarded as a basis for deportation.” (internal 
quotations omitted)). The JRAD was abolished in 1990. For an argument in favor of restoring the 
JRAD, see Jason C. Cade, Return of the JRAD, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 36 (2015). 
24 See, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin, Illegal Entry as Crime, Deportation as Punishment: Immigration Status 
and the Criminal Process, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1417, 1423-32 (2011) (discussing how deportation can 
function as punishment and also discussing other ways that noncitizens are penalized during 
criminal proceedings, such as through the denial of bail); Juliet P. Stumpf, Doing Time: Crimmigration 
Law and the Perils of Haste, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1705, 1709 (2011) (discussing how deportation decisions 
fail to adequately consider “the events and relationships” that should “factor into decisions to waive 
deportation”); Juliet Stumpf, Fitting Punishment, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1683, 1687 (2009) 
(discussing how removal decisions operate as a disproportionate punishment when it is imposed 
against long-time permanent residents who have committed minor crimes). 
25 Gerald L. Neuman, Discretionary Deportation, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 611, 621-22 (2006) 
(noting that in the early twentieth century, statutory limits on deportation often existed but that 
today, “these time limits have all but disappeared”). 
26 See, e.g., Chacón, supra note 7, at 137 (“[P]rotective features of criminal investigation and 
adjudication are melting away at the edges in certain criminal cases involving migration-related 
oﬀenses.”); Miller, supra note 7, at 618 (discussing the “criminalization” of immigration law); 
Stumpf, supra note 7, at 376 (coining the term “crimmigration”). 
27 Eagly, supra note 7, at 1281-82 (“Immigration, which now constitutes over half of the federal 
criminal workload, has eclipsed all other areas of federal prosecution. Noncitizens have become the face of 
federal prisons.” (footnotes omitted)); Sklansky, supra note 7, at 158 (“Immigration cases now are not only 
the largest category of federal criminal prosecutions; they are a majority of federal criminal prosecutions.”). 
 
2019] The Interior Structure of Immigration Enforcement 1471 
entwined at virtually every level, with immigration status aﬀecting decisions 
such as arrest, plea bargaining, dismissal, bail, and disposition.28 
As Stephen Legomsky has observed, the merger of immigration and 
criminal law has been “asymmetric” in its incorporation of criminal law 
enforcement norms but its rejection of criminal law’s procedural 
constraints.29 Since deportation is categorized as civil,30 it does not trigger 
the protections of criminal procedure.31 There is no right to counsel at the 
government’s expense.32 Those who appear in immigration court are often 
unrepresented, including children.33 As the former president of the National 
Association of Immigration Judges put it, removal is an arena where “complex 
 
28 See, e.g., Chin, supra note 24, at 1420 (“Far from being separate and independent from the 
criminal proceeding, deportation and other aspects of immigration status are often key 
considerations in the disposition of a criminal case.” (internal quotations omitted)); Eagly, supra 
note 7, 1281-82 (oﬀering a description of how federal immigration enforcement oﬃcials and criminal 
law enforcement oﬃcials coordinate enforcement activity so as to maximize the reach of 
enforcement); Eisha Jain, Prosecuting Collateral Consequences, 104 GEO. L.J. 1197, 1203-06, 1225 (2016) 
(discussing how immigration considerations aﬀect the plea bargaining process); Lee, supra note 17, 
at 559-71 (explaining how criminal law prosecutors, in eﬀect, exercise immigration enforcement 
authority by choosing whether to charge defendants with crimes that may trigger deportation); 
Sklansky, supra note 7, at 158 (“Immigration law and criminal law . . . operate[d] largely 
independently for much of the twentieth century, but over the past three decades the two ﬁelds have 
become increasingly intertwined.”). 
29 Stephen H. Legomsky, A New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal 
Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469, 472 (2007). 
30 See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 729-30 (1893) (stating that deportation 
proceedings have “all the elements of a civil case” and are “in no proper sense a trial or sentence for 
a crime or oﬀense”). 
31 See DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION 2 (2007) (“One wonders how those who 
experienced the Palmer Raids would react if they could have foreseen that, nearly a century later, 
over 325,000 people would face removal proceedings in a single year, many under mandatory 
detention, unprotected from unreasonable searches and selective prosecution, only a third 
represented by counsel, and none with the right to appointed counsel.”). 
32 See Immigration and Nationality Act § 240(b)(4)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(A) (2012) 
(providing that alien will be represented “at no expense to the Government” in removal proceedings); 
Orantes-Hernandez v. Thornburgh, 919 F.2d 549, 554 (9th Cir. 1990) (stating that aliens may obtain 
counsel at their own expense in removal proceedings); see also Jennifer M. Chacón, Privatized 
Immigration Enforcement, 52 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 1, 4 (2017) (“Migrants have a right to counsel 
in removal proceedings, but not at the government’s expense.”); Peter L. Markowitz, Deportation Is 
Different, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1299, 1302 (2011) (“[T]he government can whisk immigrants away 
into detention thousands of miles away from their home where they lack access to the counsel, 
evidence, and witnesses they need to prevail in their removal proceeding . . . .”). 
33 See Ingrid V. Eagly & Steven Shafer, A National Study of Access to Counsel in Immigration 
Court, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 7 (2015) (“By looking at individual removal cases decided on the merits, 
we ﬁnd that only 37% of immigrants had counsel during our study period from 2007 to 2012.”); 
Fernanda Santos, It’s Children Against Federal Lawyers in Immigration Court, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 20, 
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/21/us/in-immigration-court-children-must-serve-as-their-
own-lawyers.html [https://perma.cc/SVF4-EJ4M] (noting that unlike in criminal proceedings or 
child welfare proceedings, children are required to represent themselves in an adversarial proceeding 
against a government lawyer). 
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and high stakes matters . . . are being adjudicated in a setting which most 
closely resembles traﬃc court.”34   
In a nod to the “death is diﬀerent” jurisprudence,35 some writers have 
conceptualized deportation as a “diﬀerent” penalty.36 Just as the death penalty 
triggers heightened procedures as compared to other criminal cases, they 
argue, deportation should likewise trigger heightened procedural 
protections.37 This approach focuses on how deportation is experienced, 
rather than attaching signiﬁcance to the label of civil versus criminal. In a 
2010 decision, the U.S. Supreme Court in Padilla v. Kentucky adopted this 
view of deportation and held that defense attorneys are required to advise 
defendants about the immigration consequences of guilty pleas.38 In taking 
this approach, the Court emphasized how deportation carries stakes that may 
be far higher than the formal criminal punishment. 
In sum, some immigration scholars have emphasized how deportation 
operates as a punishment, regardless of its formal label. They have also 
emphasized how deportation may be triggered without adequate procedural 
safeguards. The relevant point of comparison in this analysis tends to be 
between felony criminal enforcement and immigration enforcement. 
II. THE INTERIOR STRUCTURE OF IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT 
Despite its many contributions, the deportation-centric approach 
understates the reach of immigration enforcement. Deportation is not 
 
34 Memorandum from Dana Leigh Marks, President, Nat’l Ass’n of Immigration Judges 2 (Oct. 
2009), https://pennstatelaw.psu.edu/_file/NAIJ%20Priorities%20Short%20List%20-
%20October%202009.pdf [https://perma.cc/28BG-EMYX]; see also Jennifer Lee Koh, Removal in the 
Shadows of Immigration Court, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 182 (2017) (citing the description of immigration 
court given by Dana Leigh Marks). 
35 For a summary and critique of this jurisprudence, which triggers heightened procedural 
protections for capital cases as compared to other criminal cases, see Rachel E. Barkow, The Court of 
Life and Death: The Two Tracks of Constitutional Sentencing Law and the Case for Uniformity, 107 MICH. 
L. REV. 1145, 1162-74 (2009). 
36 See, e.g., Beth Caldwell, Banished for Life: Deportation of Juvenile Oﬀenders as Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 2261, 2262 (2013) (“Every one knows that to be forcibly taken 
away from home and family and friends and business and property, and sent across the ocean to a 
distant land, is punishment, and that oftentimes most severe and cruel.” (quoting Fong Yue Ting v. 
United States, 149 U.S. 698, 740 (1893) (Brewer, J., dissenting))); Aliza B. Kaplan, Disabled and 
Disserved: The Right to Counsel for Mentally Disabled Aliens in Removal Proceedings, 26 GEO. IMMIGR. 
L.J. 523, 524 (2012) (noting that the Supreme Court described deportation as “result[ing] in the loss 
of ‘all that makes life worth living’” (quoting Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 147 (1945))); 
Markowitz, supra note 32, at 1301-02 (“[D]eportation does not ﬁt neatly into the civil or criminal 
box, but rather . . . it lives in the netherworld in between.”). 
37 For a discussion of how civil legal providers and criminal defense attorneys have attempted 
to ﬁll a gap in the provision of immigration legal services, see generally Ingrid V. Eagly, Gideon’s 
Migration, 122 YALE L.J. 2282 (2013). 
38 559 U.S. 356, 374 (2010). 
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synonymous with immigration enforcement. It is perhaps not even the most 
salient benchmark for evaluating immigration enforcement. Rather, it is the 
tip of a much larger enforcement pyramid. 
At the top of the pyramid are the relatively few who are placed in removal 
proceedings. At the base are those who remain present long-term without 
lawful immigration status. Somewhere in the middle are those who 
experience formal mechanisms of immigration enforcement short of 
deportation, such as arrest or detention. 
Those who are never placed in removal proceedings still experience 
immigration enforcement in a number of ways. In recent years, immigration 
screening has been increasingly linked to routine interactions, including with 
police, employers, housing providers, and others. The theory behind this 
approach is that immigration enforcement is an additive that can be folded 
into the process of arrest or of employee hiring without changing the nature 
of the underlying relationship. In theory, it can serve as a cost-eﬀective way 
of identifying and removing those who are deportable. 
These enforcement mechanisms, however, create hidden costs. They 
reorder power dynamics; they place employers, police, and others in positions 
of power relative to unauthorized migrants. This, in turn, has a far-reaching 
impact, including on those who never experience deportation. Awareness of 
the possibility that routine interactions may trigger heightened enforcement 
can suppress socially valuable behavior. 
Before proceeding further, a note on terminology is in order. While my 
focus is on undocumented migrants, many aspects of this analysis apply to 
those with legal immigration status as well. Despite popular accounts that 
frequently depict sharply delineated categories of “legal” versus “illegal” 
aliens, there is no such sharp distinction. Immigration status “can more 
accurately be understood as existing along a spectrum.”39 Some of those 
currently without legal status exist in what immigration scholar David Martin 
has described as “twilight” statuses, where they may be eligible for legal status 
in the future.40 Others with legal status are aware of the possibility that their 
status may be revoked or changed.41 Thus, while the analysis centers on 
undocumented migrants, it is not limited to undocumented migrants. 
This Part sketches the contours of the immigration enforcement pyramid, 
describes immigration enforcement mechanisms other than deportation, and 
explains their impact at the base of the pyramid. 
 
39 Ingrid V. Eagly, Criminal Justice for Noncitizens: An Analysis of Variation in Local Enforcement, 
88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1126, 1137 (2013). 
40 David A. Martin, Twilight Statuses: A Closer Examination of the Unauthorized Population, 
MIGRATION POL’Y INST., June 2005, at 1 (describing how certain categories of immigrants may 
have claims to obtain lawful permanent resident status, such as temporary protected status). 
41 For instance, lawful permanent residents may be subject to deportation based on criminal convictions. 
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A. The Immigration Enforcement Pyramid 
The heuristic of the pyramid offers one way to illuminate the reach of 
immigration enforcement. It shows the centrality of enforcement mechanisms 
other than deportation, the role of actors other than federal immigration 
enforcement agents, and the manner in which enforcement practices at the 
base of the pyramid operate differently from enforcement at the top. In its 
reach, immigration enforcement mirrors in certain respects Alexandra 
Natapoff ’s discussion of the “penal pyramid” in the criminal justice system.42 
The pyramid oﬀers one helpful analogy for understanding the reach of 
interior immigration. The pyramid might also be described as an iceberg: 
removal numbers capture the tip of the iceberg, but they do not begin to 
capture the impact of immigration enforcement on those at the bottom, who 
remain present and aware of the possibility of removal.43 The heuristic of the 
pyramid is useful, ﬁrst, in oﬀering a visual that captures the reach of 
immigration enforcement beyond the removal numbers. It also shows how 
immigration policy debates that focus on deportation ignore much of the 
interior work that immigration enforcement is doing. 
In the context of misdemeanors, Natapoff employs the pyramid as a way to 
understand the scope of the penal system. Just as felonies tend to dominate 
criminal law scholarship, deportation tends to dominate immigration policy 
discussions. In both criminal law and immigration scholarship, the focus on the 
most severe type of penalty—a prison term or deportation, respectively—tends 
to obscure the significance of other forms of enforcement. 
Second, the focus on deportation obscures key elements of how 
immigration enforcement operates. For the vast majority who remain present 
long-term, immigration enforcement operates through awareness that routine 
interactions may trigger deportation or other associated penalties, such as arrest 
or family separation. Removal numbers fail to capture this dimension of 
immigration enforcement, just as statistics on mass incarceration—troubling as 
they are—fail to capture the true scope of the criminal justice system.44 
 
42 See generally Natapoﬀ, supra note 8. 
43 I do not mean to suggest that the pyramid is the only heuristic for visualizing the reach of 
the immigration enforcement system. As Juliet Stumpf has helpfully suggested to me, immigration 
enforcement could also be conceptualized as a Venn diagram with overlapping areas of influence, such 
as with police and employers. 
44 As Natapoff develops, misdemeanors constitute an estimated eighty percent of state court 
workloads. Natapoff, supra note 8, at 80. The vast majority of people who experience contact with the 
criminal justice system do so through the misdemeanor process. Id. at 79-80. For recent contributions 
to the burgeoning literature on misdemeanors, see generally ISSA KOHLER-HAUSMANN, 
MISDEMEANORLAND: CRIMINAL COURTS AND SOCIAL CONTROL IN AN AGE OF BROKEN 
WINDOWS POLICING (2018); ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, PUNISHMENT WITHOUT CRIME (2018); 
Brandon Buskey & Lauren Sudeall Lucas, Keeping Gideon’s Promise: Using Equal Protection to Address 
the Denial of Counsel in Misdemeanor Cases, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2299 (2017); Samuel R. Gross, 
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Third, a focus on deportation fails to capture the signiﬁcance of the threat 
of an arrest. In the immigration context, arrest matters not just because it is 
the ﬁrst step on the path toward deportation; it also can trigger family 
separation or detention in its own right. In this respect, immigration 
enforcement also bears similarities to low-level criminal law enforcement. 
Although criminal defendants are entitled to the presumption of innocence, 
a mere arrest carries signiﬁcant penalties, such as ﬁnes, jail time, loss of work, 
or potential eviction from public housing, regardless of whether a criminal 
conviction is ultimately imposed.45 Thus, an arrest—even if it is unlikely to 
result in a conviction—can carry signiﬁcant costs. Similarly, the threat of an 
arrest—either a criminal arrest or an immigration arrest—is meaningful, even 
if that arrest is unlikely to result ultimately in removal. 
Relatedly, for both immigration and for low-level criminal offenses, public 
and private actors have broad discretion to initiate arrest by contacting law 
enforcement.46 Arrest decisions reflect a number of factors other than probable 
cause. Race in particular plays an important role in determining who is arrested 
for both immigration crimes and other crimes.47 Black and Latino men are 
significantly more likely to be arrested than whites.48 In the immigration 
context, “appearance of Mexican ancestry” may be used to justify stops.49 
 
Errors in Misdemeanor Adjudication, 98 B.U. L. REV. 999 (2018); Eisha Jain, Capitalizing on Criminal 
Justice, 67 DUKE L.J. 1381 (2018); Eisha Jain, Proportionality and Other Misdemeanor Myths, 98 B.U. L. 
REV. 953 (2018); Irene Oritseweyinmi Joe, Rethinking Misdemeanor Neglect, 64 UCLA L. REV. 738 
(2017); Alexandra Natapoff, The High Stakes of Low-Level Criminal Justice, 128 YALE L.J. 1648 (2019); 
Jenny Roberts, Informed Misdemeanor Sentencing, 46 HOFSTRA L. REV. 171 (2017); and Megan 
Stevenson & Sandra Mayson, The Scale of Misdemeanor Justice, 98 B.U. L. REV. 731 (2018). 
45 Jain, Proportionality and Other Misdemeanor Myths, supra note 44, at 954 (explaining how the constraints 
of criminal procedure do not work as intended, given the impact of arrest even without conviction). 
46 To be clear, criminal law enforcement and immigration enforcement, in practice, have substantial 
overlap. See, e.g., Eagly,  supra note 7, at 1288 (discussing role overlap with federal prosecutors and 
immigration prosecutors); Sklansky, supra note 7, at 159 (“Immigration enforcement and criminal justice 
are now so thoroughly entangled it is impossible to say where one starts and the other leaves off; growing 
numbers of practitioners describe themselves as working in the merged field of ‘crimmigration.’”). 
47 See Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 556 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (determining that 
New York City police oﬃcers made 4,400,000 stops pursuant to its “stop and frisk” policy in an 
eight-year period from 2004 to 2012 and that over eighty percent of those stopped were racial 
minorities); Eisha Jain, Arrests as Regulation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 809, 817-25 (2015) (summarizing 
arrest statistics and providing potential reasons for high rates of arrest). 
48 Arrests themselves have a signiﬁcant racialized impact. One out of every three American 
youths can expect to be arrested by the age of twenty-three. Robert Brame et al., Cumulative 
Prevalence of Arrest from Ages 8 to 23 in a National Sample, 129 PEDIATRICS 21, 25 (2012). 
Approximately forty-nine percent of black men and forty-four percent of Latino men will be 
arrested by the age of twenty-three. Robert Brame et al., Demographic Patterns of Cumulative Arrest 
Prevalence by Ages 18 and 23, 60 CRIME & DELINQ. 471, 478 (2014). 
49 See Devon W. Carbado & Cheryl I. Harris, Undocumented Criminal Procedure, 58 UCLA L. 
REV. 1543, 1548-49 (2011) (discussing Supreme Court doctrine that has sanctioned the practice of 
using racial identity as “a basis for determining whether a person is undocumented or ‘illegal’”). 
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Immigration enforcement of course has important diﬀerences from 
misdemeanor enforcement. Misdemeanors matter because they trigger 
signiﬁcant hidden costs, such as loss of work, potential jail time, and other 
consequences of a criminal record.50 But in the absence of more serious 
charged conduct, an arrest alone is not the ﬁrst step toward a lengthy prison 
sentence. By contrast, arrest in the immigration context may also be the ﬁrst 
step on the path toward deportation—though in practice, the vast majority of 
undocumented migrants will never be removed. 
The bottom of the immigration enforcement pyramid is also far less 
defined than the bottom of the misdemeanor pyramid. Generally, the size of 
the misdemeanor system is estimated by the number of arrests filed in any 
given year.51 Yet the size of the bottom of the immigration enforcement 
pyramid is murky. The same forces that lead undocumented migrants to lay 
low and avoid detection also make it hard to measure the size of undocumented 
population, its characteristics, and the impact of immigration enforcement. 
The balance of this Part focuses on two important aspects of immigration 
enforcement at the bottom of the pyramid: the role of enforcement 
mechanisms other than deportation and the role of actors other than federal 
immigration enforcement oﬃcials. 
B. Enforcement Mechanisms 
Although deportation receives the lion’s share of attention, other 
immigration enforcement mechanisms, such as arrest, detention, or family 
separation, affect far more people.52 In some cases, these mechanisms operate in 
tandem with deportation: the prospect of prolonged immigration detention, for 
instance, leads some undocumented migrants to agree to “voluntary” removal.53 
In other cases, these enforcement mechanisms combine with deportation; those 
who are ultimately removed first experience arrest and detention. 
 
50 See, e.g., JAMES JACOBS, THE ETERNAL CRIMINAL RECORD 1-8 (2015) (discussing the 
impact of a criminal record). 
51 A common complaint about misdemeanors is shoddy recordkeeping that makes it difficult to 
identify exactly how many cases are processed each year. See Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1320 (“Unlike felony cases and convictions, about which federal and state governments 
keep relatively good records, the world of misdemeanor cases is radically underdocumented.”); Stevenson 
& Mayson, supra note 44, at 733-34 (noting that the lack of data regarding misdemeanors extends even 
to basic information such as the number of misdemeanor filings each year). 
52 These are mechanisms of immigration enforcement insofar as they “give force to” 
immigration laws. For an explanation of how “private enforcement” of immigration laws functions 
to give eﬀect to immigration law, see, e.g., Huyen Pham, The Private Enforcement of Immigration 
Laws, 96 GEO. L.J. 777, 784 (2008). 
53 ”Voluntary” removal does not carry the bar on readmission that is triggered by formal 
removal. However, in practice, it is not voluntary in the sense of being freely chosen or desired. 
Those who are voluntarily removed, for instance, may be accompanied by an ICE escort. 
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Arrest is one important mechanism of immigration enforcement. Since 
2013, when Secure Communities was rolled out on a nationwide basis, every 
custodial criminal arrest—meaning one where the arrested individual is taken 
to the precinct and fingerprinted—has triggered immigration screening.54 
Secure Communities operates as an information sharing arrangement between 
local police, the FBI, and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).55 
When an arrested individual is booked, his fingerprints are taken and shared 
with DHS, which then cross-checks the fingerprints against a separate 
immigration-related fingerprint database. The goal is to screen for 
unauthorized presence.56 If the cross-check returns a “hit,” that signals that the 
arrested individual may be present without authorization.57 If DHS makes a 
probable cause determination that the arrested individual is present without 
authorization, the agency has the discretion to send a detainer request to the 
local jail.58 The detainer notifies the jail that the arrested individual is suspected 
of lacking lawful immigration status and requests that the jail retain custody of 
the arrested individual for an additional forty-eight hours after he would 
otherwise be released, so that immigration enforcement officials can come to 
the facility and assume custody.59 Secure Communities thus vastly raises the 
stakes of low-level arrests.60 Any arrest, regardless of the charge—and 
regardless of whether it is ultimately dismissed—may trigger deportation. 
 
54 For a discussion of the rollout of Secure Communities, see Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, 
Policing Immigration, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 87, 87-90 (2013). 
55 While Secure Communities is the most widespread use of arrests as an immigration 
enforcement tool, it is not the only use of arrest as an immigration enforcement tool. Some arrests 
are for immigration-related crime, such as misdemeanor illegal reentry or felony illegal reentry 
following deportation. See, e.g., Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 
§ 103(a), 100 Stat. 3359, 3380 (codiﬁed as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1546(b)) (“Whoever uses . . . an 
identiﬁcation document, knowing (or having reason to know) that the document was not issued 
lawfully for the use of the possessor . . . shall be ﬁned under this title, imprisoned not more than 5 
years, or both.”). ICE agents also make their own immigration arrests. 
56 See Jain, supra note 47, at 826-27 (describing the information-sharing arrangement of the 
Secure Communities program). 
57 This enforcement approach is underinclusive because the immigration database only 
contains entries for those who have previously been ﬁngerprinted by DHS, such as those who 
entered lawfully and then overstayed a visa. Those who have never previously been ﬁngerprinted, 
such as those who entered unlawfully and were not detected by immigration enforcement oﬃcials, 
would not return a hit. 
58 In the original iteration of Secure Communities, detainers were not supported by probable 
cause. Michael Kagan, Immigration Law’s Looming Fourth Amendment Problem, 104 GEO. L.J. 125, 131-
33 (2015) (discussing case law ﬁnding Fourth Amendment violations in cases where detainers were 
unsupported by probable cause). 
59 Id. at 131; see also Jain, supra note 47, at 828-29. 
60 The vast majority of arrests are for low-level offenses, and many of them never result in 
conviction. Low-level marijuana arrests, for instance, far outstrip arrests for more serious crimes. 
Christopher Ingraham, More People Were Arrested Last Year over Pot than for Murder, Rape, Aggravated 
Assault and Robbery—Combined, WASH. POST (Sept. 26, 2017), 
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Beyond arrest, immigration detention itself serves as an enforcement 
mechanism, albeit one closely associated with deportation.61 In practice, 
immigration detention is indistinguishable from criminal detention.62 Some 
immigrant detainees are housed in the same prisons and jails as prisoners.63 
The threat of detention plays an important role in giving both criminal and 
immigration prosecutors more leverage than they would otherwise have. 
Prosecutors can leverage the threat of prolonged detention to induce 
“voluntary” removal. This pattern unfolded on a mass scale in a 2008 
immigration raid in Postville, Iowa. Over the course of four days, 270 workers 
signed “‘exploding’ plea agreements, entered binding felony guilty pleas in 
court, and received criminal sentences.”64 The workers agreed to the pleas in 
part because they were aware that they would otherwise face continued 
detention.65 As Juliet Stumpf has observed, “Some workers spoke up, asking 





61 See, e.g., Alina Das, Immigration Detention: Information Gaps and Institutional Barriers to 
Reform, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 137, 137-38 (2013) (documenting a dramatic increase in detention over 
the past twenty-ﬁve years). ICE now reports an average daily detained population of close to 38,000, 
and the Trump administration recently sought to increase funding to support an average daily 
population of 48,000 adults. Laurel Wamsley, As It Makes More Arrests, ICE Looks for More Detention 
Centers, NPR (Oct. 26, 2017), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/10/26/560257834/as-it-
makes-more-arrests-ice-looks-for-more-detention-centers [https://perma.cc/TYF8-TPEW]; see also 
Anil Kalhan, Rethinking Immigration Detention, 110 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 42, 43 (2010) (noting 
that “detention now represents a deprivation as severe as removal itself ”). 
62 See Emily Ryo, Fostering Legal Cynicism Through Immigration Detention, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 
999, 1024-37 (2017) (explaining how immigration detention is experienced as punitive, 
notwithstanding the civil label); see also César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Immigration Detention 
as Punishment, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1346, 1349 (2014) (“Whatever the actual reason for detention and 
despite immigration detention’s legal characterization as civil, individuals in immigration confinement 
are frequently perceived to be no different than individuals in penal confinement.”); Eli Rosenberg, 
So Many Immigrants Are Being Arrested that ICE Is Going to Transfer 1,600 to Federal Prisons, WASH. 
POST (June 7, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2018/06/07/so-many-
immigrants-are-being-arrested-that-ice-is-going-to-transfer-1600-to-federal-
prisons/?utm_term=.8b6caa17934e [https://perma.cc/WQ49-735J]. Dora Schriro, a former director of 
the Office of Detention Policy and Planning, stated, “Immigration Detention and Criminal 
Incarceration detainees tend to be seen by the public as comparable, and both confined populations 
are typically managed in similar ways.” DORA SCHRIRO, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 
IMMIGRATION DETENTION OVERVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS 4 (2009). 
63 Rosenberg, supra note 62. 
64 Eagly, supra note 7, at 1301; see also Juliet Stumpf, The Process Is the Punishment in 
Crimmigration Law, in THE BORDERS OF PUNISHMENT 59 (Katja Franko Aas & Mary Bosworth 
eds., 2013) (noting that the majority of the workers took the deal because “[t]he plea oﬀered the 
certainty of quicker release and the avoidance of formal proceedings . . . .”). 
65 Stumpf, supra note 64. 
66 Id. 
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In addition to arrest and detention, the threat of family separation functions 
as a highly visible enforcement mechanism. Just as the presence of family in 
the United States constitutes part of the “pull” factor of immigration,67 the risk 
of family separation plays an important role in immigration enforcement. 
Unauthorized or “mixed” immigration status families with minor children in 
particular report being keenly aware of the possibility of separation.68 
As in the criminal context, any arrest, including a minor one, can trigger 
family separation. Immigration-related arrests, however, create heightened 
susceptibility to family separation, and they also magnify the likelihood that 
children will be left without adequate supervision. For one, in the criminal 
context, arrest typically occurs individually. By contrast, interior immigration 
enforcement has periodically occurred on a mass scale, with workplace raids that 
round up and apprehend hundreds of suspected unauthorized workers at a time. 
This, in turn, magnifies the likelihood of prolonged family separation. When 
police make arrests, they are supposed to follow protocols designed to ensure 
that minor children are provided with social services support.69 Immigration 
lawyers, however, have argued that similar protocols have not been followed in 
workplace raids, given factors such as language barriers and the possibility that 
arrested workers may be transported and detained in remote facilities. 
A lawsuit challenging a factory raid in Massachusetts over a decade ago 
remains illustrative. ICE agents arrested over 300 employees, placed them in 
custody for civil immigration violations, and transported them to detention in 
Texas.70 The workers alleged that child welfare agencies were not given 
sufficient notice of the raid, which left minor children without adult 
supervision.71 Recent raids have taken place on an even larger scale and exhibited 
similar dynamics.72 Immigration advocates have documented prolonged family 
 
67 See, e.g., Kerry Abrams & R. Kent Piacenti, Immigration’s Family Values, 100 VA. L. REV. 629, 
630 (2014) (“The vast majority of immigrants who acquire permanent residency each year do so 
based on family ties.”). 
68 See RANDY CAPPS ET AL., A PROFILE OF U.S. CHILDREN WITH UNAUTHORIZED PARENTS 1 
(2016) (reporting that 4,100,000 U.S. citizen children live with at least one parent who is an unauthorized 
migrant); Leisy J. Abrego & Cecilia Menjívar, Immigrant Latina Mothers as Targets of Legal Violence, 37 INT’L 
J. SOC. FAM. 9, 12-14 (2011) (describing how fear of family separation influences decisions of 
undocumented mothers, such as deciding to keep children from school and avoiding contact with public 
agencies); Nina Rabin, Understanding Secondary Immigration Enforcement: Immigrant Youth and Family 
Separation in a Border County, 47 J.L. & EDUC. 1, 15-20 (2018) (discussing how fear of separation affects 
youth); Vikki Ortiz, Mixed-Status Immigrant Families Fear Trump’s Policies to Come, CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 18, 
2017), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-immigrants-mixed-status-trump-met-20170118-story.html 
(discussing how long-term undocumented parents with U.S. citizen children fear family separation). 
69 See Jain, supra note 47, at 841-42 & nn.170-74 (discussing protocols that police departments 
take to notify social services in order to care for minor children after a custodial parent’s arrest). 
70 Aguilar v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf ’t, 510 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2007). 
71 Id. 
72 See, e.g., Raquel Aldana, Of Katz and “Aliens”: Privacy Expectations and the Immigration Raids, 41 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1081, 1092-93 (2008) (“ICE arrested 1,282 workers [during a raid on six Swift & Co. 
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separation, with mass arrest and detention leaving children of workers “stranded 
at daycare centers and with babysitters,” landlords, or relatives.73 
Until recently, family separation has typically been conceptualized as a 
collateral or inevitable “third party” harm that results from enforcement 
decisions, rather than as a means of deterrence in itself.74 Yet in the 
immigration context, family separation itself has been appropriated as a 
means of deterrence.75 During a six-week period in April and May 2018, DHS 
separated nearly 2000 children from their parents.76 The numbers are 
unprecedented in recent history. By way of comparison, during a spike in 
unlawful entry during the summer of 2013, when Border Patrol apprehended 
over 6000 families, less than 500 were transferred to ICE custody for any 
purpose.77 The 2018 family separations involved more than just those 
apprehended during the course of unlawful entry. They also included asylum 
seekers who entered lawfully by appearing at a port of entry and who 
 
meatpacking plants] on immigration violations and some existing criminal warrants. Most workers 
arrested were placed in immigration removal proceedings. About 240 workers were charged criminally.”). 
73 See Maria Sacchetti, ICE Raids Meatpacking Plant in Rural Tennessee; 91 Immigrants Arrested, 
WASH. POST (Apr. 6, 2018), https://www.lmtonline.com/news/article/ICE-raids-meatpacking-
plant-in-Tennessee-97-12812525.php [https://perma.cc/H6FR-V3DK] (describing an immigration 
raid that resulted in ninety-seven arrests, one of the largest workplace raids in a decade); Samantha 
Schmidt, ‘Utter Chaos’: ICE Arrests 114 Workers in Immigration Raid at Ohio Gardening Company, 
WASH. POST (June 6, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-
mix/wp/2018/06/06/utter-chaos-ice-arrests-114-workers-in-immigration-raid-at-ohio-gardening-
company/?utm_term=.b7ed0035b407 [https://perma.cc/Z28B-DYFP] (reporting a mass raid carried 
out by 200 federal immigration oﬃcials that resulted in 114 arrests); see also Elizabeth Oglesby, U.S. 
Communities Can Suﬀer Long-Term Consequences After Immigration Raids, CONVERSATION (June 18, 
2018), https://theconversation.com (search “US communities can suﬀer long-term”; then follow 
article hyperlink) [https://perma.cc/98S7-PWVJ] (describing the eﬀects on the community of the 
2008 Massachusetts raid, including children who were separated from their parents and found in 
empty apartments by their landlords). 
74 Darryl K. Brown, Third-Party Interests in Criminal Law, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1383, 1400 (2002) 
(describing “third party interests” in criminal law and offering the interests of families of a criminal 
defendant as an example of a “collateral consequence visited upon others when an offender is punished”). 
75 See, e.g., Transcript: White House Chief of Staﬀ John Kelly’s Interview with NPR, NPR (May 11, 
2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/05/11/610116389/transcript-white-house-chief-of-staﬀ-john-kellys-
interview-with-npr [https://perma.cc/AT5Z-F9B2] (stating that family separation serves as a 
deterrent to illegal immigration); see also Emily Ryo, Detention as Deterrence, 71 STAN. L. REV. 
ONLINE 237, 239 (2019) (drawing on “literature in psychology, behavioral economics, and 
criminology to suggest that detention as deterrence is unlikely to operate in the way that some 
policymakers might expect or desire”). 
76 Michael Scherer & Josh Dawsey, Trump Cites as Negotiating Tool his Policy of Separating Immigrant 




77 Declaration of Ronald Vitiello at 7, Flores v. Lynch, 212 F. Supp. 3d 907 (2015) (No. 85-
4544), https://www.aila.org/File/Related/14111359n.pdf [https://perma.cc/FC7U-L45Y]. 
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articulated a credible fear of persecution.78 In hundreds of cases, family 
separation remained prolonged. Two months after a federal judge ordered the 
families reunited, over 400 children remained separated from their parents.79 
The 2018 family separations had far-reaching implications, and not only 
because of their scale and duration. They represented a deliberate decision to 
use family separation itself as an enforcement tool, rather than treating family 
separation as an unfortunate but inevitable byproduct of the decision to 
deport adults. As a widely circulated audio recording of separated children 
demonstrated, line-level enforcement oﬃcials were well aware that the policy 
of separating children imposed stark and immediate trauma.80 The 
separations, in eﬀect, signaled a choice to impose trauma on children with the 
aim of deterrence. They also signaled what leading immigration scholar David 
Martin described as an “astounding casualness about precise tracking of 
family relationships—as though eventual reuniﬁcation was deemed unlikely 
or at least unimportant, even for toddlers and preschoolers.”81 The family 
separations also showed the limits of legal rules. Government oﬃcials missed 
 
78 Karoun Demirjian, GOP, Democrats Are Outraged but at Odds over Ending Family Separation at 
the Border, WASH. POST (June 17, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/powerpost/gop-
democrats-are-outraged-but-at-odds-over-ending-family-separation-at-border/2018/06/17/6667f3a4-
7247-11e8-b4b7-308400242c2e_story.html?utm_term=.bab7d23d4734 [https://perma.cc/JTN2-TJZZ] 
(quoting Republican Senator Susan Collins as noting “numerous credible media accounts” revealing 
that parents who appear at a legal port of entry and claim asylum are being separated from their 
children); Miriam Jordan, Family Separation at Border May Be Subject to Constitutional Challenge, Judge 
Rules, N.Y. TIMES (June 6, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/06/us/family-separations-
migrants-court.html [https://perma.cc/SQ62-GTV6] (discussing the case of an asylum seeker who 
appeared at a port of entry and was forcibly separated from her seven-year-old daughter, who was 
placed in a separate detention facility, for a period of four months); Joshua Barajas, More than 400 
Migrant Children Remain Separated from Their Parents. Here’s What We Know, PBS (Sept. 7, 2018, 5:11 
PM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/more-than-400-migrant-children-remain-separated-
from-their-parents-heres-what-we-know [https://perma.cc/Z46D-WR7M] (reporting on DHS’s 
adaptation of new regulations that would allow the government to detain children of migrants for 
periods longer than twenty days); Joel Rose, Doctors Concerned About ‘Irreparable Harm’ to Separated 
Migrant Children, NPR (June 15, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/06/15/620254326/doctors-warn-
about-dangers-of-child-separations [https://perma.cc/Q6E7-A9XH] (describing the potential long-
term medical consequences of holding separated migrant children in a shelter, such as behavioral 
problems and poor brain development). 
79 Barajas, supra note 78. 
80 See Ginger Thompson, Listen to Children Who’ve Just Been Separated from Their Parents at the 
Border, PROPUBLICA (June 18, 2018), https://www.propublica.org/article/children-separated-from-
parents-border-patrol-cbp-trump-immigration-policy [https://perma.cc/G3FX-WXRB] (presenting 
audio recording of children weeping while a border patrol agent comments that “we have an orchestra 
here” and “[w]hat’s missing is a conductor”). 
81 See Letter from David A. Martin, Professor, Univ. of Va. Sch. of Law, to Kirstjen M. Nielsen, 
Sec’y of Homeland Sec. (July 16, 2018) (stating reasons for resigning from the Homeland Security 
Advisory Council (HSAC)) (on ﬁle with author). Professor Martin further noted that the family 
separation policy “crystallized for many HSAC members profound doubts about the administration’s 
commitment to the rule of law.” Id. 
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court-imposed reuniﬁcation deadlines because they deported some parents 
without reuniting them with their children ﬁrst.82 
C. Multiple Enforcement Agents 
In the past twenty years, federal immigration enforcement has become 
remarkably diffuse; a host of public and private actors engage in enforcement, 
not just federal immigration enforcement officials. Immigration screening and 
surveillance occurs during the process of booking an arrested individual and 
during the process of employee hiring.83 In the context of policing, Secure 
Communities automates information sharing between local police and DHS.84 
In the context of employment, E-Verify automates the process of determining 
whether new employees have lawful immigration status as required by the 
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986.85 This dynamic is the product 
of technological changes that permit immigration screening and surveillance in 
routine circumstances,86 and federal decisions to delegate enforcement 
authority to an array of actors. In addition, states and localities have periodically 
made efforts to assert their own immigration enforcement power.87 
One stated rationale for these programs is to widen the enforcement net 
in a cost-eﬀective way. While unlawful entry receives the lion’s share of 
attention, a signiﬁcant percentage of the undocumented population entered 
 
82 John Burnett, Government Misses Migrant Family Reunification Deadline, NPR (July 10, 2018), 
https://www.npr.org/2018/07/10/627821359/government-misses-migrant-family-reunification-deadline 
[https://perma.cc/JGS9-VVM7]. 
83 See Anil Kalhan, Immigration Surveillance, 74 MD. L. REV. 1, 8 (2014) (identifying “four distinct 
sets of immigration surveillance practices: identification, screening and authorization, mobility 
tracking and control, and information sharing” (emphasis omitted)); Stephen Lee, Workplace 
Enforcement Workarounds, 21 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 549, 554 (2012) (“While there are many social 
institutions through which migrants move, two have emerged as central to immigration law’s 
interior enforcement agenda: the workplace and the criminal justice system.”). 
84 Anil Kalhan, Immigration Policing and Federalism Through the Lens of Technology, Surveillance, 
and Privacy, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 1105, 1108 (2013). 
85 Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 101(b), 100 Stat. 3359, 
3365-68 (codiﬁed at 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b) (2012)); Juliet P. Stumpf, Getting to Work: Why Nobody Cares 
About E-Verify (and Why They Should), 2 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 381, 383 (2012). Some states passed 
similar laws prior to IRCA. See Pham, supra note 52, at 787 (“In 1971, ﬁfteen years before IRCA, 
California passed a law that prohibited employers from knowingly hiring unauthorized workers and 
threatened them with civil ﬁnes of $200 to $1000 for violations. Ten states and one city soon followed 
suit, passing similar legislation.” (footnote omitted)). 
86 Kalhan, supra note 83, at 8. 
87 The most well-known example is Arizona’s Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe 
Neighborhoods Act, commonly known as S.B. 1070. 2010 Ariz. Legis. Serv. 113 (West). In 2012, the 
U.S. Supreme Court struck down several provisions of the law, including a provision that gave local 
police oﬃcers the ability to conduct warrantless arrests of anyone “the oﬃcer has probable cause to 
believe . . . has committed any public oﬀense that makes the person removable.” Arizona v. United 
States, 567 U.S. 387, 393 (2012). For a discussion of S.B. 1070, see Kerry Abrams, Plenary Power 
Preemption, 99 VA. L. REV. 601, 626-34 (2013). 
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lawfully and then overstayed a visa.88 Any eﬀective immigration enforcement 
policy therefore must contain an interior enforcement component. State and 
local police act as “force multipliers” who, in the words of Kris Kobach, cast 
an immense net by providing “occasional, passive, voluntary [assistance] . . . 
during the course of normal law enforcement activity.” 89 In other words, the 
theory is that police can conduct immigration enforcement without 
undertaking any signiﬁcant additional work.90 
Another stated rationale for some programs is to reduce the risk of racial 
profiling. One theory is that if immigration screening occurs on every arrested 
individual at the time she is taken into custody and fingerprinted, then police 
officers will not try to seek out those who they suspect are undocumented on 
the basis of crude racial proxies or the use of Spanish. In launching Secure 
Communities, the Obama administration described the value of immigration 
screening taking place “behind the scenes” of the arrest.91 The goal was for the 
executive to “acquire information about where all the formally deportable 
noncitizens [were], and what they [were] up to, in order . . . to make systematic 
rather than arbitrary decisions about whom to deport.”92 
In practice, however, linking arrests to immigration enforcement still 
creates incentives for police oﬃcers to engage in racial proﬁling, even when 
the immigration screening is done on the back end. Police remain aware of 
the likelihood that all arrests trigger immigration screening. As Hiroshi 
Motomura has discussed, police who view deportation as a desirable end have 
incentives to make arrests on the basis of suspected unauthorized status, even 
if those arrests are unlikely to result in a criminal conviction.93 
Relatedly, police and other public and private actors also have incentives that 
deviate from those of federal immigration enforcement officials. Employers 
 
88 JEFFREY S. PASSEL, PEW HISPANIC CTR., THE SIZE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE 
UNAUTHORIZED MIGRANT POPULATION IN THE U.S.: ESTIMATES BASED ON THE MARCH 2005 
CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY 1, 16 (2006) (ﬁnding that in 2006, of the approximately 11,000,000 
unauthorized immigrants in the United States, twenty-ﬁve to forty percent entered lawfully but 
overstayed a visa). 
89 Kobach, supra note 11, at 181. 
90 See Kobach, supra note 6, at 160 (“If a strategy of attrition through enforcement were implemented 
nationwide, it would gradually, but inexorably, reduce the number of illegal aliens in the United States.”). 
91 Memorandum from Immigration & Customs Enf ’t, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Secure 
Communities Talking Points (Jan. 12, 2010), 
https://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/secure_communities/talkingpointsjanuary122010.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/M4XF-FQAU]. 
92 Adam B. Cox, Enforcement Redundancy and the Future of Immigration Law, 2012 SUP. CT. REV. 31, 61. 
93 For an elaboration of this argument, see Hiroshi Motomura, The Discretion That Matters: 
Federal Immigration Enforcement, State and Local Arrests, and the Civil–Criminal Line, 58 UCLA L. 
REV. 1819, 1845 (2011). 
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routinely ignore laws prohibiting the hiring of undocumented workers.94 
Undocumented migrants comprise five percent of the overall U.S. workforce, 
and they make up a much higher percentage of certain industries, such as 
farming and construction.95 Common explanations for why employers hire 
undocumented workers include labor shortages, the ease with which 
employment documents can be falsified, lack of employer training in conducting 
effective immigration screening, and incentives to hire cheaper workers.96 
While police and employers are the most common enforcement agents, they 
are far from alone. Other sites of enforcement include schools and courthouses. 
In recent years, “school resource officers”—police officers posted inside 
schools—have reported students to ICE on suspicion of gang membership. Yet 
in practice, “gang membership” is an amorphous term untethered from any 
uniform legal standards,97 which enables relatively common and innocuous 
behavior to trigger immigration penalties. For instance, in March 2018, a 
Baltimore student spent six months in ICE detention after a school resource 
officer reported that the student had been part of a group that threatened a 
classmate.98 In January 2018, a Houston student was detained by ICE for four 
months after a fight with another student.99 
Court personnel have also assisted immigration enforcement oﬃcials. 
Enforcement in courthouses is not restricted to those convicted of criminal 
oﬀenses that render them deportable. It also includes those who are arrested 
for minor oﬀenses as well as those who appear as victims or witnesses.100 
 
94 See Lee, supra note 16, at 1106 (“[W]hile it is true that IRCA formally prohibits employers from 
hiring unauthorized immigrants under threat of civil and criminal sanction, it has been so infrequently 
enforced that employers can escape detection in all but the most egregious circumstances.”). 
95 See Jens Manuel Krogstad et al., 5 Facts About Illegal Immigration in the United States, PEW RES. 
CTR. (Nov. 28, 2018), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/04/27/5-facts-about-illegal-
immigration-in-the-u-s [https://perma.cc/ZD5P-46DA] (noting that unauthorized migrant workers 
account for twenty-four percent of the farming industry and fifteen percent of the construction 
industry); see also MAYOR’S OFFICE OF IMMIGRANT AFFAIRS, STATE OF OUR IMMIGRANT CITY 
18 (2018) (observing high labor force participation of undocumented workers in New York City). 
96 See e.g., David A. Martin, Resolute Enforcement Is Not Just for Restrictionists: Building a Stable 
and Eﬃcient Immigration Enforcement System, 30 J.L. & POL. 411, 414 (2015) (discussing the use of 
false documents to circumvent federal immigration policy); Pham, supra note 52, at 825 (noting that 
private employers have no centralized source for immigration enforcement training). 
97 See Jennifer M. Chacón, Whose Community Shield?: Examining the Removal of the “Criminal 
Street Gang Member”, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 317, 320 (“No uniform legal standards govern the 
identiﬁcation of criminal street gang members for purposes of ICE enforcement, and while the 
‘associates’ of criminal street gang members are often removed, there are no legal standards deﬁning 
who constitutes an associate of a criminal street gang member.”). 
98 Hannah Dreier, He Drew His School Mascot—and ICE Labeled Him a Gang Member, 
PROPUBLICA (Dec. 27, 2018), https://features.propublica.org/ms-13-immigrant-students/huntington-
school-deportations-ice-honduras/ [https://perma.cc/SG67-6ZG4]. 
99 Id. 
100 See Devlin Barrett, DHS: Immigration Agents May Arrest Crime Victims, Witnesses at Courthouses, 
WASH. POST (Apr. 4, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/dhs-
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The enforcement actions discussed thus far represent systematic 
delegation of immigration enforcement authority, meaning that federal 
immigration agents require or encourage other actors to function as 
immigration enforcement agents through formal programs. Public or private 
actors also engage in immigration enforcement pursuant to state or local 
ordinances that require immigration screening. One well-known example is 
the ultimately invalidated Hazleton, Pennsylvania, ordinance that required 
landlords to check immigration status.101 Some private actors also engage in 
immigration screening because they misunderstand what their legal 
obligations are—they may believe that they are required to report those 
suspected of being undocumented. As Huyen Pham has discussed, for a 
period of time Greyhound Bus Lines instructed employees not to sell tickets 
to anyone suspected of being an illegal alien and included warnings that 
employees look out for Spanish words that could reference smuggling.102 
Individual companies or actors may also be motivated to engage in 
immigration enforcement for other reasons. In a violation of consumer 
protection law and in apparent contradiction with its own business interests, 
employees at the Motel 6 Hotel chain provided conﬁdential personal 
information of 9000 customers to ICE agents in the absence of any warrant.103 
Immigration enforcement thus has an important hidden impact at the 
bottom of the pyramid. The vast majority of the undocumented population 
never experiences formal mechanisms of immigration enforcement. They are 
not detained or arrested. They are certainly never deported. Yet they are keenly 
aware that key institutions have the ability to trigger immigration enforcement. 
Employers wear two hats: they are simultaneously employers and immigration 
screeners. Police likewise fulfill their community role as police officers while 
simultaneously wielding the power to trigger immigration screening. 
This dynamic opens the door to racial discrimination and to the 




PAKH] (“‘Just because they’re a victim in a certain case does not mean there’s not something in their 
background that could cause them to be a removable alien,’ David Lapan, a Department of Homeland 
Security spokesman, said in a briefing to reporters.”). 
101 See Hiroshi Motomura, The Rights of Others: Legal Claims and Immigration Outside the Law, 
59 DUKE L.J. 1723, 1734 (2010) (discussing Hazleton ordinances, adopted in 2006 and 2007 which 
prohibited employers from hiring undocumented workers and landlords from renting to 
undocumented migrants). The ordinances were found to be preempted by federal immigration law. 
Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 724 F.3d 297, 300 (3d Cir. 2013). 
102 See Pham, supra note 52, at 795. In response to a lawsuit from immigrant advocacy 
organizations, Greyhound modified its policy. Id. at 796. 
103 Alicia A. Caldwell & Chris Kirkham, Washington Attorney General Sues Motel 6 for Sharing 
Guest Info with Feds, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 3, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/washington-attorney-
general-sues-motel-6-for-sharing-guest-info-with-feds-1515016334. 
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incentives for undocumented migrants to lay low and to avoid interactions 
that may result in arrest, detention, family separation, and deportation.104 It 
chills workers from reporting unsafe conditions or from ﬁling police reports 
about unlawful activity.105 Importantly, these incentives exist to some degree 
regardless of how immigration screening is in fact exercised. 
Interview-based accounts with undocumented communities show that 
undocumented migrants report substantial uncertainty about whether routine 
interactions might trigger immigration enforcement. For instance, some 
undocumented migrants report not taking children, including U.S. citizens, to 
health care providers because they fear that either the children or parents may 
be reported to immigration enforcement officials.106 They are less likely to 
obtain health insurance for undocumented family members.107 Some report 
avoiding school on days of suspected immigration raids.108 These dynamics are 
pervasive, and they are reported even in so-called “sanctuary” jurisdictions.109 
 
104 Rose Cuisan Villazor has deployed the analogy of “the undocumented closet” to describe 
the dynamic of undocumented migrants living “closeted lives” that reﬂect “awareness of the ever-
present threat of being deported.” Rose Cuison Villazor, The Undocumented Closet, 92 N.C. L. REV. 
1, 42 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Stella Burch Elias, Immigrant Covering, 58 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 765, 805 (2017) (observing that undocumented migrants “understand that if 
they are arrested by the federal immigration authorities it will likely lead to deportation” and 
therefore they “live in constant fear of removal and the attendant separation from their family, 
friends, community, and property”). 
105 See, e.g., Cora Engelbrecht, Fewer Immigrants Are Reporting Domestic Abuse. Police Blame Fear 
of Deportation, N.Y. TIMES (June 3, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/03/us/immigrants-
houston-domestic-violence.html [https://perma.cc/F7W5-PKZC] (describing Houston’s rapid drop 
in domestic violence reports in light of tough new immigration enforcement). 
106 See, e.g., Abrego & Menjívar, supra note 68, at 15-16 (collecting interview-based accounts 
describing how mixed immigration status families will go to great lengths to avoid social services 
providers, such as for medical care and food stamps); Leisy J. Abrego & Sarah M. Lakhani, 
Incomplete Inclusion, 37 L. & POL’Y 265, 273-76 (2015) (“When [individuals] do not understand the 
kind of legal standing and entitlements that immigrants in liminal, humanitarian legal statuses 
oﬃcially have, immigrants may experience blocked mobility, a persistent fear of deportation, 
instability, confusion, and self-blame.”); Jennifer M. Chacón, Producing Liminal Legality, 92 DENV. 
U. L. REV. 709, 716 (2015) (noting how indeﬁnite administrative grace periods create even more 
anxiety for “liminal legal subjects”); Cecilia Menjívar, Liminal Legality: Salvadoran and Guatemalan 
Immigrants’ Lives in the United States, 111 AM. J. SOC. 999, 1000 (2006) (describing the pervasive sense 
of anxiety created by long-term uncertainty for undocumented migrants from Guatemala and El 
Salvador); Rabin, supra note 68, at 5. 
107 JOANNA DREBY, EVERYDAY ILLEGAL 104-06 (2015) (reporting that of 212 children living in 
eighty-one families that were interviewed, “legal status was the primary indicator of insurance 
coverage,” and noting that two-thirds of U.S. citizen children in mixed immigration status families 
had health insurance, while none of the forty-eight children who lacked legal immigration status did). 
108 See Abrego & Menjívar, supra note 68, at 15 (presenting interview-based accounts of 
undocumented mothers keeping children home from school after an immigration raid). 
109 MAYOR’S OFFICE OF IMMIGRANT AFFAIRS, supra note 95, at 22 (discussing an increase 
in ICE arrests and the impact on undocumented migrants who, in response, avoid areas where they 
fear immigration raids). 
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To some degree, this dynamic is inevitable. No one has perfect 
information about enforcement choices. In a world where many people are 
legally removable at any time but few will actually be removed, the executive 
makes decisions about how to gather information about undocumented 
migrants and prioritize removals. The enforcement process is discretionary, 
which in turn creates uncertainty about how enforcement choices are made. 
As a practical matter, this approach shifts discretion from the executive to 
street-level agents. Immigration enforcement oﬃcials have nowhere near the 
funding necessary to identify and remove the millions of noncitizens who are 
legally removable. In the absence of systemic discretion about who ought to 
be prioritized, removal decisions reﬂect who happens to be picked up by local 
agents. As a result, front-end decisions to make arrests or to otherwise trigger 
immigration enforcement carry much more weight. That, in turn, diminishes 
the ability of the executive branch to determine which undocumented 
migrants will be selected for removal.110 
Administrations have periodically attempted to address this dynamic 
through enforcement guidance. One approach is to prioritize certain types of 
removals while shielding other undocumented migrants from removal. The 
approach taken by the Obama administration, for instance, prioritized removal 
of those with certain felony convictions above those with certain misdemeanor 
convictions.111 The Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program 
also provided temporary relief for certain youth who met various other criteria, 
such as completing high school and not having certain criminal records.112 
 
110 See Juliet P. Stumpf, D(e)volving Discretion: Lessons from the Life and Times of Secure 
Communities, 64 AM. U. L. REV. 1259, 1264 (2015) (“Secure Communities achieved the ultimate 
delegation downward of enforcement discretion and, as a result, deprived the executive branch of 
the ability to steer the course of immigration enforcement policy.”). 
111 President Obama described the approach this way: “Felons, not families. Criminals, not 
children. Gang members, not a mom who’s working hard to provide for her kids.” Address to the 
Nation on Immigration Reform, 2014 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 2 (Nov. 20, 2014). More specifically, 
the “first priority” category included those apprehended when crossing the border, those who posed 
a national security threat, and those convicted of certain felonies. Behind this group were those with 
certain misdemeanor convictions and recent unlawful entrants. See Memorandum from Jeh Charles 
Johnson, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Thomas S. Winkowski et al. (Nov. 20, 2014), 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/ﬁles/publications/14_1120_memo_prosecutorial_discretion.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2C7J-KUEP] (establishing priorities effective January 5, 2015). 
112 See Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to David V. Aguilar, 
Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., et al. 1 (June 15, 2012), http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-
exercising-prosecutorial-discretion-individuals-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf [https://perma.cc/H6JF-
G7FZ]. For a discussion of DACA and DAPA, see Chacón, supra note 106, at 719, which notes that criteria 
for DACA eligibility include those “who were under thirty-one on the date of the announcement, who had 
entered the United States before June 15, 2007, as children under the age of sixteen, who had completed high 
school, and who did not have disqualifying criminal records.” 
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One policy-based criticism of this approach is that it does not do enough 
to oﬀer security against the possibility of immigration enforcement.113 
Delegating immigration enforcement to other actors also magniﬁes the risk 
that employers, for instance, will make mistakes or engage in strategic 
enforcement decisions that serve their own business interests. Employers and 
private enforcers are not trained on how to conduct immigration 
enforcement. Nor do they have incentives to invest time in learning how to 
most eﬀectively conduct immigration screening.114 Some employers have 
ﬁnancial incentives to hire undocumented workers and underpay them, 
banking on their reluctance to seek legal protections.115 As a result, the use of 
employers to check immigration status and keep undocumented migrants 
from working has been ineﬀective. 
In addition, even when employers attempt to adhere faithfully to all their 
legal obligations, there remains a risk of what Professor Kathleen Kim has 
described as “structural coercion,” where workers “acquiesce or decline to improve 
poor working conditions because of the constraining effects of their unauthorized 
status.”116 This dynamic can harm workers and employers alike because it can chill 
socially useful communication about dangerous or unsafe working conditions. 
Thus, even with clear enforcement guidance, there is a risk that 
undocumented migrants will have powerful incentives to avoid drawing 
attention to themselves. This concern has perhaps been magniﬁed with recent 
enforcement guidance that broadens the categories subject to priority 
removal.117 Removal priorities established in January 2017 do not diﬀerentiate 
between arrest and conviction, and they also do not distinguish based on the 
severity of the charged oﬀense.118 
 
113 During the early days of Secure Communities, a signiﬁcant percentage of removals did not 
fall within a stated priority area. Aguilar v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf ’t, 510 F.3d 1, 6 (1st 
Cir. 2007) (“The ICE agents cast a wide net and paid little attention to the detainees’ individual or 
family circumstances . . . . [and subsequently] releas[ed] dozens of employees determined either to 
be minors or to be legally residing in the United States . . . .”); Jain, supra note 47, at 829 
(“[A]pproximately twenty percent of those deported [from the interior] had no known criminal 
convictions at the time of removal.”). 
114 Huyen Pham raises this point in the context of transportation providers who have been required 
by some local anti-immigrant ordinances to check immigration status. Pham, supra note 52, at 777. 
115 See, e.g., United States v. Calimlim, 538 F.3d 706, 708-09 (7th Cir. 2008) (involving 
conviction of an employer for subjecting undocumented worker to forced labor conditions). 
116 Kathleen Kim, Beyond Coercion, 62 UCLA L. REV. 1558, 1562 (2015). 
117 A January 2017 executive order listed broad enforcement priorities, including those who 
have been convicted of or charged with any criminal oﬀense, regardless of the severity. It also 
included anyone who had committed acts that could be charged as a criminal oﬀense. Exec. Order 
No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 25, 2017). 
118 Id. 
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Recent high-profile deportations give undocumented migrants incentives 
to avoid activities that might draw attention to their immigration status.119 The 
practice of arresting and deporting foster families who offered to take in 
detained migrant children offers one example.120 Pursuant to a memorandum 
of agreement between the Department of Health and Human Services and 
DHS, potential foster families are subject to background checks and 
fingerprinting. The stated rationale is to ascertain whether there is “a 
documented risk to the safety of the unaccompanied child.”121 However, federal 
immigration enforcement officials have recently used the fingerprinting 
process as a means of conducting immigration enforcement. Forty-one 
potential foster care sponsors were arrested in June 2018 for immigration 
violations.122 Of those arrested, a reported seventy percent had no criminal 
records.123 These enforcement actions create powerful incentives for 
undocumented individuals to avoid serving as foster parents. They conflict with 
the enforcement objectives of Health and Human Services to ensure the safety 
of children. They also create other costs, such as raising the likelihood of 
children remaining in detention rather than with families.124 
News reports of interior immigration enforcement also create incentives 
for undocumented migrants to lay low. Consider a few examples. Pablo 
Calderon had lived in the United States for a decade when he was arrested 
on route to deliver pizza to an Army base. He was placed in immigration 
detention for ﬁfty-three days before a federal judge ordered his release.125 
The release order noted that aside from his immigration violation, Calderon 
 
119 As Asad L. Asad has observed, this dynamic applies to documented immigrants who have 
incentives to stay oﬀ the radar as well. Asad L. Asad, On the Radar: System Embeddedness and 
Latin American Immigrants’ Perceived Risk of Deportation 2 (Dec. 19, 2018) (unpublished 
manuscript), https://osf.io/preprints/socarxiv/dcgfw (“Documentation aﬀords some protection from 
deportation, but it can also heighten fears since the bureaucracies that ‘document’ immigrants have 
a greater perceived ability to surveil and expel them.”). 
120 The policy was in place for approximately six months in 2018. Colleen Long, U.S. Reverses 
Policy on Migrant Children’s Sponsors, AP NEWS, (Dec. 18, 2018), 
https://www.apnews.com/f34ab3a0085b453ca0d98f92bbbcbd83 [https://perma.cc/8SD9-4HBB]. 
121 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-18-506T, UNACCOMPANIED CHILDREN: 
DHS AND HHS HAVE TAKEN STEPS TO IMPROVE TRANSFERS AND MONITORING OF CARE, 
BUT ACTIONS STILL NEEDED 8 (2018). 
122 Caitlin Dickerson, Migrant Children Moved Under Cover of Darkness to a Texas Tent City, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 30, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/30/us/migrant-children-tent-city-texas.html 
[https://perma.cc/KQW7-FEK3]. 
123 Id. 
124 Tal Kopan, The Simple Reason More Immigrant Kids Are in Custody Than Ever Before, CNN 
POLITICS (Sept. 14, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/09/14/politics/immigrant-children-kept-
detention/index.html [https://perma.cc/5M4C-5GFM]. 
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had otherwise been a “model citizen” who paid taxes, had a clean criminal 
record, and who worked to support his U.S. citizen spouse and U.S. citizen 
children.126 Ten-year-old Rosa Maria Hernandez, who had been living in the 
United States since the age of three months, was detained in a Texas hospital 
while undergoing an emergency surgery.127 She was then placed in a shelter 
typically used for unaccompanied children who are apprehended while 
crossing the border.128 In another widely reported Texas case, an 
undocumented migrant was arrested at a courthouse when seeking a 
protective order and reporting domestic abuse.129 
These enforcement actions have an impact that goes well beyond the 
arrested individual. While any given undocumented migrant has a low 
likelihood of being detained and removed, indiscriminate interior enforcements 
signals that undocumented migrants risk being apprehended on the basis of 
commonplace, desirable interactions. Proponents of this approach view the 
creation of a wide enforcement net as a way to encourage “self-deportation.” The 
theory is that by appropriating individual actors as immigration enforcement 
agents, and by sending the message that even seeking medical care or legal 
assistance is fraught with the potential for arrest, detention, or deportation, the 
state can encourage those present without authorization to make the decision to 
leave.130 Yet in practice, this approach also leads those present long-term to make 
other choices. It creates incentives for the undocumented to refuse to serve as 
foster families, to steer clear of places where they might be fingerprinted or 
asked to show identification, to forgo medical care or avoid reporting crime. At 
the bottom of the immigration enforcement pyramid, the threat of immigration 
enforcement—in its many forms—has a powerful impact, even when it does not 
result in the act of removal. 
III. LESSONS FROM LOW-LEVEL CRIMINAL LAW ENFORCEMENT 
In delegating enforcement discretion to a range of public and private actors, 
immigration enforcement is not unique. It employs enforcement techniques 
that are also widely used in low-level criminal law enforcement. Misdemeanor 
enforcement routinely renders a large population subject to ongoing 
 
126 Calderon v. Sessions, 350 F. Supp. 3d 944, 949-50 (S.D.N.Y. 2018). 
127 Marwa Eltagouri, A 10-Year-Old Immigrant Was Rushed to the Hospital in an Ambulance. She Was 




129 Engelbrecht, supra note 105. 
130 K-Sue Park, Self-Deportation Nation, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1878, 1882 (2019) (describing the 
concept of “self-deportation” as one where immigration enforcement is designed to make 
“unbearable” the lives of people the state wishes to remove). 
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surveillance and to the threat of serious sanctions by public and private actors 
alike. Police who engage in “order maintenance” policing make high-volume, 
low-level arrests. The goal is not to maximize convictions, but to gather data 
about people over time, which is then used for risk assessment. Prosecutors 
monitor how many arrests a certain individual has had within a given period of 
time to determine whether to pursue criminal charges.131 
Private actors engage in monitoring as well. Employers, for instance, 
function as law enforcement oﬃcers for parolees and probationers when they 
monitor whether the supervised population complies with court-ordered 
work requirements. They, in eﬀect, have the ability to determine whether a 
probationer ends up in prison. Landlords function as law enforcement when 
“nuisance” ordinances require them to evict tenants based on suspected 
disorderly or criminal activity. Landlords who have the ability to credibly 
threaten eviction based on calls to 911 wield signiﬁcant leverage over tenants. 
Beyond formal monitoring mechanisms, arrests alone—regardless of 
whether they result in conviction—can trigger serious penalties, such as jail time 
for those who owe outstanding child support,132 eviction for arrested individuals 
who live in public housing,133 or loss of custody, particularly if a parent is already 
involved with social services supervision.134 These civil penalties may be 
experienced as more harmful than any formal criminal sentence. 
Thus, it is not only undocumented migrants who experience ongoing 
monitoring and the potential for serious adverse consequences triggered by 
routine interactions. For many, low-level contact with the criminal justice 
system can also have outsized consequences. While immigration scholars have 
assessed how deportation can resemble criminal punishment, thus far, they 
have overlooked how immigration enforcement techniques short of 
deportation resemble low-level criminal law techniques. 
Recognizing the structural parallels between immigration enforcement 
and low-level criminal law enforcement has important conceptual payoffs. It 
shows that certain costs of immigration enforcement—undocumented workers 
being subject to exploitation or avoiding contact with the police—are neither 
unique to immigration enforcement, nor are they inevitable. They should be 
anticipated when enforcement discretion is broadly delegated to public and 
 
131 Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice and Mass Misdemeanors, 66 STAN. L. REV. 611, 668 
(2014); see also Malcolm M. Feeley & Jonathan Simon, The New Penology: Notes on the Emerging Strategy 
of Corrections and Its Implications, 30 CRIMINOLOGY 449, 455 n.12 (1990) (discussing the shift to aggregate 
risk assessment, rather than individual culpability determinations, as part of the “new penology”). 
132 Cortney E. Lollar, Criminalizing (Poor) Fatherhood, 70 ALA. L. REV. 125, 126 (2018). 
133 See Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 136 (2002) (permitting a family’s 
eviction from public housing based on the oﬀ-premises drug arrest of a household member); Jain, 
supra note 47, at 834 (discussing Rucker). 
134 Jain, supra note 47, at 842. 
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private actors. It also reveals hidden costs of the “force multiplier” strategy on 
society at large, not just on undocumented migrants. These costs emerge not 
just in immigration, but also in the low-level criminal law enforcement, where 
the stakes are supposedly much lower. The comparison shows the limits of 
certain deterrence arguments and suggests that some costs of monitoring a 
population long-term are structural; they are not unique to immigration. 
This Part takes a step back from immigration and explores structural 
parallels between immigration enforcement and low-level criminal law 
enforcement. It ﬁrst brieﬂy explains why it is that some populations are 
unlikely to be eﬀectively deterred by criminal law enforcement. It then 
analyzes structural similarities between immigration and criminal law 
techniques for monitoring and considers their hidden costs. 
A. The Limits of Deterrence 
One rationale for highly visible interior immigration enforcements—meaning 
publicized efforts to prosecute, identify and remove undocumented migrants—is 
deterrence. Proponents argue that such efforts will cause those who are already 
present without authorization to leave. A decade ago, Kris Kobach put it this way: 
The twelve to twenty million illegal aliens in the United States need not be 
rounded up and forcibly removed through direct government action. Illegal aliens 
can be encouraged to depart the United States on their own . . . . Illegal aliens are 
rational decision makers. If the risks of detention or involuntary removal go up, 
and the probability of being able to obtain unauthorized employment goes down, 
then at some point, the only rational decision is to return home.135 
This argument justifies expanded interior enforcement. However, it rests on 
a number of unsupported assumptions.136 It assumes that in the face of escalated 
enforcement, a rational cost–benefit calculus would lead to the decision to depart 
or “self-deport.”137 While this approach may work for recent arrivals or others 
who can easily return to their countries of origin, it can lead those who have 
deep ties to the United States to make a rational decision to try to stay off the 
radar and avoid detection. The “self-deportation” approach also does not account 
 
135 Kobach, supra note 6, at 156. 
136 The author provided no support for the assertion that there are “twelve to twenty” 
undocumented migrants in the United States as of 2008. The Pew Research Center estimated 
between eleven million and twelve million unauthorized immigrant populations during that time. 
See PASSEL & COHN, supra note 2. Kobach’s argument also does not recognize how some 
undocumented migrants may have legal claims to remain. See Martin, supra note 40, at 1 (discussing 
“twilight” statuses). 
137 See generally Park, supra note 130. 
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for the full costs of enforcement, including the social costs of policies that impact 
society at large and on “mixed” immigration status families.138 
Like immigration enforcement, criminal law enforcement routinely 
reaches conduct that it does not eﬀectively deter. For those who lack the 
ability or the incentives to comply with the law, or those who believe that 
they are unlikely to get caught, enforcement eﬀorts can simply drive 
prohibited behavior underground. This, in turn, can lead to more harmful 
behavior.139 For instance, jurisdictions that take away the drivers’ licenses of 
those with unpaid criminal justice debt may see an uptick in driving without 
a license.140 Drug crackdowns may lead to a market for more dangerous 
crimes, such as drug traﬃcking.141 
Undocumented migrants who have lived and worked in the United States 
long-term have much at stake in remaining. Many have U.S. citizen children 
or other deep roots in the United States.142 Over time, connections to their 
countries of origin may have withered, particularly given the diﬃculty of 
returning to visit. Even if undocumented migrants are interested in returning 
to their countries of origin, doing so is no easy task. Moving itself is expensive 
and the prospect of re-establishing roots after over a decade away can be 
daunting. These factors, along with the relatively low likelihood of detection, 
make long-term undocumented migrants unlikely to return to their countries 
of origin in signiﬁcant numbers. 
Engaging in immigration enforcement designed to encourage “self-deportion” 
also poses serious costs. The balance of this Part unpacks hidden costs, such as the 
risk of creating more crime, undermining other law enforcement goals, and leading 
populations to avoid reporting crime and engaging in other socially useful behavior. 
 
138 See Hiroshi Motomura, We Asked for Workers, but Families Came: Time, Law, and the Family 
in Immigration and Citizenship, 14 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 103, 111 (2006) (discussing the impact of 
immigration enforcement on mixed immigration status families); see also Hiroshi 
Motomura, Making Legal: The DREAM Act, Birthright Citizenship, and Broad-Scale Legalization, 16 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1127, 1131 (2012) (summarizing common arguments for immigration reform 
in the context of the Dream Act, including the need to integrate undocumented children). 
139 See generally David Michael Jaros, Perfecting Criminal Markets, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1947 
(2012) for an elaboration of this argument. 
140 See, e.g., LAWYERS’ COMM. FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, NOT JUST A FERGUSON PROBLEM: 
HOW TRAFFIC COURTS DRIVE INEQUALITY IN CALIFORNIA 14 (2015) (noting that seventeen 
percent of adult Californians have had a license suspension for failure to pay a debt and that 
suspended license cases lead to further penalties when people drive without licenses to get to work). 
141 Jaros, supra note 139, at 1947; see also William J. Stuntz, Self-Defeating Crimes, 86 VA. L. REV. 
1871, 1873 (2000) (discussing how enforcement of certain “vice crimes” such as those enforced during 
Prohibition “might prove self-defeating . . . by undermin[ing] the norms on which they rest”). 
142 PASSEL & COHN, supra note 2, at 6. 
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B. Hidden Enforcement Costs 
Immigration scholars have tended to conﬁne their analyses of the “force 
multiplier” phenomenon to immigration law. But the practice of delegating 
enforcement discretion to an array of actors is an exceedingly common one in 
criminal law enforcement as well. This Section explores structural parallels 
to immigration enforcement in the context of workplace enforcement, 
housing enforcement, and policing decisions. In each of these contexts, the 
approach is designed to deter, but in practice, can carry serious hidden costs. 
Work requirements and “nuisance ordinances” are important examples of 
surveillance and enforcement delegation in the criminal law context. In each 
regime, private actors have the ability to trigger serious harm, even if it is not 
the most serious harm of long-term incarceration or deportation. As discussed 
further below, both of these enforcement mechanisms carry related hidden 
enforcement costs. They can undermine enforcement of other laws, and they 
can create new forms of lawbreaking. 
Work requirements are a common condition of probation.143 Some states 
also compel parents to work if they owe child support.144 The rationales for 
work requirements vary. In the child support context, work requirements are 
imposed to try to deter so-called “deadbeat” parents from shirking support 
obligations. In the probation context, work requirements were “[i]nitially 
conceived as a way to reintegrate offenders into the community through a close 
interpersonal relationship between [the enforcement] agent and offender.”145 
The theory was that work itself—even when court-ordered and enforced with 
the threat of prison—would serve a rehabilitative function. As Jonathan Simon 
and Malcolm Feeley have observed, this rationale evolved over time to a 
“managerial” one, with supervision of work requirements used as a 
“monitoring technique” designed to “detect high rates of technical violations” 
and lead to further discipline.146 In other words, work requirements are used 
as one way to measure the supervised individual’s ability to “get with the 
program” and to adhere to the conditions of court-ordered probation. Those 
who are able to comply with work requirements are viewed as less risky; those 
who are not are likely subject to further discipline. 
Employers as well as probation officers monitor compliance. Probation 
officers have the ability to make unannounced inspections in homes and 
 
143 See Fiona Doherty, Obey All Laws and Be Good: Probation and the Meaning of Recidivism, 104 
GEO. L. J. 291, 310 (2016) (“In nearly every jurisdiction in [this] study, working or going to school 
is a central requirement of being on probation.”). 
144 See United States v. Ballek, 170 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 1999) (“We conclude that child-support 
awards fall within that narrow class of obligations that may be enforced by means of imprisonment 
without violating the constitutional prohibition against slavery.”). 
145 Feeley & Simon, supra note 131, at 455 n.12. 
146 Id. at 455. 
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workplaces.147 They have the ability to interview employers to assess 
compliance. Employers in some cases also operate like probation officers, and 
they report directly to courts. A judge in a Syracuse drug court put it this way: 
“Your employer is now on a team of people who are reporting to me. When he 
calls me up and tells me that you are late, or that you’re not there, I’m going 
to send the cops out to arrest you.”148 Both the worker and the employer are 
aware that the employer has the ability to trigger a serious penalty. The system 
essentially “deputizes” the employer as a probation officer.149 
On the surface, work requirements in the context of probation or child 
support may appear to have nothing to do with work in the context of 
undocumented migrants. As a matter of substantive law, these legal regimes 
are opposites: probationers are required to work, while undocumented 
migrants are prohibited from working. The parallels emerge not as a matter 
of substantive law, but rather in terms of enforcement structure and its impact 
on power dynamics within workplaces. In both contexts, workers are keenly 
aware that their employers are not just employers; they are also enforcement 
agents for a large and powerful enforcement bureaucracy, be it criminal law 
or immigration law. In some cases, employers are likewise keenly aware of 
their dual role as well. These dynamics alter workplace power dynamics by 
giving employers an enormous amount of leverage over workers. 
This dynamic creates law enforcement tradeoﬀs, meaning enforcement of 
one law—the requirement that the supervised individual work—creates the 
likelihood that other laws will not be enforced. Those subject to work 
requirements have incentives not to report dangerous working conditions, 
unlawful discrimination, or other forms of misconduct. In the immigration 
context, exploitation of migrants—both unauthorized workers and legally 
present guestworkers—is well documented.150 Similar opportunities for 
exploitation occur with probationers, who are aware that they must “get to 
work or go to jail.”151 The vast majority of aﬀected workers are low income, 
with typical earnings of less than $1,000 per month.152 Work requirements can 
create conditions that trigger a cycle of punishment, lost work, and 
 
147 Doherty, supra note 143, at 296. 
148 James L. Nolan, Jr., Therapeutic Adjudication, 39 SOC’Y, Jan.–Feb. 2002, at 29, 32. 
149 NOAH ZATZ ET AL., GET TO WORK OR GO TO JAIL: WORKPLACE RIGHTS UNDER 
THREAT 12 (2016); see also Noah D. Zatz, A New Peonage?: Pay, Work, or Go to Jail in Contemporary 
Child Support Enforcement and Beyond, 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 927, 933 (2016) (explaining how child 
support enforcement eﬀectively makes debtors work or risk criminal sanctions). 
150 See generally S. POVERTY LAW CTR., CLOSE TO SLAVERY: GUESTWORKER PROGRAMS 
IN THE UNITED STATES (2013) (documenting, based on lawsuits and interviews, exploitation in 
guestworker programs). 
151 ZATZ ET AL., supra note 149, at 4. 
152 Id. at 5. 
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homelessness. The threat of jail time is not an idle one: an estimated 9000 
people are currently incarcerated for violating work requirements.153 
Work requirements, in eﬀect, give employers more bargaining power 
relative to workers. Coercive employers can take advantage of these dynamics 
by engaging in unlawful activity, such as wage theft, with the knowledge that 
employees may be unlikely to complain.154 But even when employers act in 
good faith, the threat of jail time or another signiﬁcant penalty can suppress 
socially valuable activity. It can lead employees to avoid engaging in open 
communication about work conditions. 
Private actors also exercise quasi-criminal law enforcement power in 
housing. Nuisance ordinances are a common example of the “force multiplier” 
strategy for low-level cases. According to one estimate, approximately 2000 
nuisance ordinances exist in the United States.155 They have received scant 
attention by legal scholars, but they represent an important legal 
intervention.156 Nuisance ordinances are designed to be a cost-eﬀective means 
of removing tenants who cause disturbances in rental homes. Developed as a 
response to overburdened 911 lines, the ordinances permit, or in some cases 
require, landlords to evict tenants after calls to the police.157 If multiple 911 
calls are placed from or about a particular residence in a certain timeframe, 
 
153 Id. 
154 In addition, undocumented workers who do speak out about unlawful activity may not be 
entitled to all of the same remedies as other workers. See, e.g., Hoﬀman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. 
NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 151-53 (2002) (holding that an undocumented worker who was illegally ﬁred 
for trying to organize a union was not entitled to the remedy of backpay because the worker was not 
authorized to work in the United States). 
155 Crime Free Multi-Housing: Keep Illegal Activity off Rental Property, INT’L CRIME FREE ASS’N, 
http://www.crime-free-association.org/multi-housing.htm [https://perma.cc/9FQP-YYAD]. See 
generally Gretchen Arnold & Megan Slusser, Silencing Women’s Voices: Nuisance Property Laws & 
Battered Women, 40 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 908 (2015); Matthew Desmond & Nicol Valdez, Unpolicing 
the Urban Poor: Consequences of Third-Party Policing for Inner-City Women, 78 AM. SOC. REV. 117 (2012); 
Peter Edelman, More Than a Nuisance, NEW REPUBLIC (Apr. 10, 2018), 
https://newrepublic.com/article/147359/nuisance-laws-making-poverty-crime 
[https://perma.cc/Y7G5-VN57]. 
156 In contrast to the dozens of articles on immigration-criminal law enforcement, nuisance 
ordinances have been understudied. For an important forthcoming discussion of how “crime-free” 
housing ordinances promote residential segregation, see Deborah Archer, The New Housing 
Segregation: The Jim Crow Eﬀects of Crime-Free Housing Ordinances, 117 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2019). For additional literature on nuisance enforcement, see generally Amanda K. Gavin, 
Note, Chronic Nuisance Ordinances: Turning Victims of Domestic Violence into “Nuisances” in the Eyes of 
Municipalities, 119 PENN ST. L. REV. 257 (2014); Salim Katach, Note, A Tenant’s Procedural Due 
Process Right in Chronic Nuisance Ordinance Jurisdictions, 43 HOFSTRA L. REV. 875 (2015); and Sarah 
Swan, Comment, Home Rules, 64 DUKE L.J. 823 (2015). 
157 Desmond & Valdez, supra note 155, at 121. 
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the landlord will receive a letter from the police indicating that the subject 
property is a “nuisance” that must be “abated,” including by eviction.158 
The particulars of the ordinances vary by jurisdiction: some localities send 
nuisance abatement letters after three or more 911 calls in a thirty-day window, 
while others require only two or more calls within a one-year window.159 
Depending on the locality, police have broad discretion to categorize conduct as 
a nuisance. For instance, some ordinances include “crime free” provisions, which 
either require or permit evictions if a tenant or guest “allegedly engages in 
criminal activity on or near the property, regardless of whether the resident was 
a victim.”160 Others are broadly worded to permit eviction on the basis of 
offenses such as littering and excessive noise.161 Landlords risk penalties—“fines, 
property forfeiture, or even incarceration”—if they do not “abate the nuisance,” 
such as by evicting problem tenants.162 
As with immigration, nuisance enforcement is designed to expand the 
enforcement net. Landlords are expected to deal with oﬀenses deemed 
nuisances precisely because they do not merit police resources.163 Yet 
downgrading the oﬀense creates high stakes for tenants, who have much to 
lose by eviction. In expensive cities, tenants face extraordinary diﬃculty in 
ﬁnding aﬀordable housing. To put it mildly, it is a landlord’s market. Over 
eleven million families spend over half their income on housing, and some 
spend up to eighty percent of their income on housing.164 Evicted tenants 
face the possibility that they may be unable to ﬁnd alternative housing and 
become homeless.165 Evicted families with children have a particularly hard 
time ﬁnding other homes.166 Moving itself is not cheap; it can be cost-
 
158 See, e.g., Arnold & Slusser, supra note 155, at 910 (describing such procedures in St. Louis’s 
nuisance ordinance). 
159 Desmond & Valdez, supra note 155, at 122 (discussing Milwaukee’s ordinance, which 
classiﬁes a premises that has generated more than two 911 calls within thirty days as a nuisance); 
Arnold & Slusser, supra note 155, at 910 (noting that the St. Louis, Missouri ordinance required 
landlords to abate a nuisance after two calls to 911 in a one-year period). 
160 U.S. DEP’T. OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL GUIDANCE ON 
APPLICATION OF FAIR HOUSING ACT STANDARDS TO THE ENFORCEMENT OF LOCAL NUISANCE 
& CRIME-FREE HOUSING ORDINANCES AGAINST VICTIMS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 5-6 (2016). 
161 Desmond & Valdez, supra note 155, at 122. 
162 Id. at 120. 
163 See id. at 119-20 (describing how nuisance ordinances arose in response to police being 
unable to respond to the volume of 911 calls). 




166 See Matthew Desmond & Carl Gershenson, Who Gets Evicted? Assessing Individual, 
Neighborhood, & Network Factors, 62 SOC. SCI. RES. 362, 372 (2017) (presenting an empirical study 
ﬁnding evidence of discrimination the basis of family status and theorizing that landlords may have 
an interest in “replacing large households with smaller ones, or families with childless tenants . . . 
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prohibitive for those with little disposable income. For all these reasons, 
tenants have powerful incentives to avoid triggering nuisance enforcement, 
even when it comes at the expense of not reporting crime. 
Nuisance enforcement alters power dynamics between tenants, the police, 
and landlords in far-reaching ways. It can create law enforcement tradeoﬀs, 
meaning that nuisance enforcement results in other laws not being enforced. 
And it can create the conditions that allow serious forms of crime to ﬂourish, 
precisely because tenants have limited practical ability to call the police. 
All tenants are entitled to police protection, but nuisance enforcement 
creates an incentive not to report crime. It has a chilling effect on the reporting 
and prosecution of domestic violence. Some domestic violence victims make 
the rational decision to forgo police protection in order to avoid eviction. In 
one widely reported example, Lakisha Briggs chose not to call 911 after being 
assaulted in her home because her landlord had warned her that any additional 
calls to 911 would result in her eviction.167 While Briggs’ example is unusual in 
that it received media attention, it is not an isolated one. An empirical study 
by Matthew Desmond and Nicol Valdez over a two-year period in Milwaukee 
found that domestic violence calls represented one-third of all citations.168 
Nuisance enforcement also encourages some landlords to interfere with 
private living arrangements, with some landlords directly informing tenants 
not to call 911 except in life-threatening situations or informing them to oust 
boyfriends who cause domestic disturbances.169 Nuisance enforcement can 
thus chill reporting and prosecution of other types of crime. 
Absent the ordinance, a landlord would have little apparent incentive to 
regulate a tenant’s calls to the police. Nuisance enforcement, however, creates 
incentives for landlords to quell calls to 911. It places landlords in a position of 
 
[b]ecause children can cause added stress on property, disturb neighbors, and attract unwanted 
scrutiny by child welfare agents or law enforcement oﬃcers”). 
167 A neighbor called 911 to report the assault and to seek medical attention for Briggs, who ended up 
being airlifted to the hospital. Afterward, she was served with an eviction notice. Erik Eckholm, Victims’ 
Dilemma: 911 Calls Can Bring Eviction, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 16, 2013), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/17/us/victims-dilemma-911-calls-can-bring-eviction.html 
[https://perma.cc/2CWK-2Q5V]; Briggs v. Borough of Norristown et al., ACLU (Sept. 18, 2014), 
https://www.aclu.org/cases/briggs-v-borough-norristown-et-al?redirect=womens-rights/briggs-v-borough-
norristown-et-al [https://perma.cc/W2LN-PR72]. 
168 See Desmond & Valdez, supra note 155, at 131, which also quotes a landlord informing tenants, 
You can’t be calling the police because your boyfriend hit you again. They’re not your 
big babysitter. It happened last week, and you threw him out. But then you let him 
back in, and it happens again and again. Either learn from the ﬁrst experience or, you 
know, leave. Don’t take him back and get hit because you tell him, I don’t know, “I 
don’t want to sleep with you.” 
Other landlords reported explicitly informing tenants that they would begin eviction proceedings if 
the tenants called the police in “non–life threatening” situations. Id. at 134. 
169 Id. at 131. 
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power relative to tenants. Landlords may use that power in a way that deters 
people from seeking police protection. These dynamics unfold against a 
backdrop of legal regulation where tenants are often practically unable to assert 
their legal rights, given understaffed housing courts and lack of access to 
counsel in housing court.170 
Like regulations aimed at deterring unlawful immigration, nuisance 
enforcement also facilitates unlawful discrimination. Desmond and Valdez 
found that “properties located in black neighborhoods were more likely to 
receive nuisance citations for domestic violence” even after controlling for 
relevant factors, such as the overall presence of domestic violence calls.171 “All 
else being equal, a property located in an 80 percent black 
neighborhood . . . was over 3.5 times more likely to receive a nuisance 
citation” than other properties.172 Thus, expanded enforcement discretion also 
expands the opportunities for racial discrimination. 
In addition to private actors, police of course also exercise signiﬁcant 
discretion. Arrest decisions can trigger serious harm, even for low-level 
arrests. This can lead to “system avoidance”—an unwillingness of those who 
have prior contacts with the criminal justice system to engage with certain 
key institutions, such as police.173 
Undocumented migrants are far from the only population with good 
reason to avoid minor contact with the police. Probationers face the 
possibility of probation revocation for minor law enforcement encounters, 
such as speeding or a parking ticket—or even a mere complaint about a 
potential legal violation.174 Those who owe criminal justice debt can end up 
in jail because of their inability to pay.175 This dynamic unfolds in two ways. 
First, the criminal process is used to punish failure to pay certain types of 
 
170 See, e.g., Fessler, supra note 164 (observing that many tenants in housing court are not 
represented by a lawyer and do not know what their rights are). 
171 Desmond & Valdez, supra note 155, at 132. 
172 Id. at 132. 
173 Brayne, supra note 14, at 368. 
174 Doherty, supra note 143, at 301. 
175 This dynamic unfolds in spite of the prohibition against debtors’ prisons. See Williams v. 
Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 240-41 (1970) (holding that imprisonment due to a prisoner’s inability to pay 
a debt violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause); see also Bearden v. Georgia, 
461 U.S. 660, 668-69, 672-73 (1983) (holding that the practice of imprisoning a probationer who was 
unable to pay oﬀ his legal debts violates equal protection). But see Laura I Appleman, Nickel and 
Dimed into Incarceration: Cash-Register Justice in the Criminal System, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1483, 1489-90 
(2016) (describing how states have informally re-created debtors’ prisons); Joseph Shapiro, Supreme 
Court Ruling Not Enough to Prevent Debtors Prisons, NPR (May 21, 2014), 
https://www.npr.org/2014/05/21/313118629/supreme-court-ruling-not-enough-to-prevent-debtors-
prisons [https://perma.cc/X7VV-BSM6] (explaining that a quarter of people in a county jail for 
misdemeanor oﬀenses over a four-month period in 2013 were there because they had not paid court 
ﬁnes and fees). 
 
1500 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 167: 1463 
debt, such as child support and penal debt. Second, those who owe child 
support and penal debt—broadly deﬁned as “debt stemming from civil and 
criminal penalties and ﬁnes, prosecution costs, court fees, usage fees, and 
interest”—ﬁnd that unlike many other categories of debt, these debts are not 
dischargeable in bankruptcy court.176 Thus, debtors have restricted remedies 
if they are unable to pay. 
For debtors, these dynamics magnify the stakes of arrest. Unpaid debt 
triggers a downward spiral. It may trigger arrest warrants, which can lead to 
jail time or suspension of a driver’s license, which in turn can lead to loss of 
work and additional debt.177 The cycle then repeats itself. 
This is the pattern that unfolded for Walter L. Scott, who was shot in the 
back and killed when he ﬂed from police in 2015. Scott ﬂed after he was pulled 
over for a broken taillight; he was not involved in any criminal activity. Scott, 
however, had good reason to avoid arrest. Scott’s child support debt had 
previously led to an outstanding criminal warrant. At the time of his fatal 
encounter with the police, he had already experienced losing what he 
described as the “best job [he] ever had” when unpaid child support led to a 
two-week stint in jail.178 His awareness of the possibility of being jailed again 
due to the debt may have led him to ﬂee from the police, which in turn, led 
to a police oﬃcer using deadly force. His case is not an anomaly. According 
to a recent report, “[i]n major cities, 5% of all fathers are incarcerated for 
falling behind on child support.”179 
These enforcement choices may create lasting incentives to avoid the 
police and other institutions that are perceived as participating in surveillance. 
Sociologist Sarah Brayne found that those with prior contact with the criminal 
justice system avoid interactions with “surveilling” institutions, meaning 
institutions that keep formal records, such as banks, hospitals, or the police.180 
Brayne coined the term “system avoidance” to describe the pattern of 
avoidance with institutions that keep records (that put people “in the system”), 
 
176 Abbye Atkinson, Consumer Bankruptcy, Nondischargeability, and Penal Debt, 70 VAND. L. 
REV. 917, 919 (2017) (footnote omitted); see also Developments in the Law—Policing, 128 HARV. L. 
REV. 1706, 1727 (2015) (describing usage fees in the criminal context); Zatz, supra note 149, at 931 
(explaining that unlike private debts, criminal justice debts are not dischargeable in bankruptcy and 
can result in imprisonment for nonpayment). 
177 See Brandon L. Garrett & William Crozier, Driver’s License Suspension in North Carolina 2 
(Duke Law Sch., Pub. Law & Legal Theory Series No. 2019-27), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3355599 
(finding that fifteen percent of North Carolinians had their driver’s licenses suspended and that most 
suspensions were for failure to appear in court and summarizing research showing that the suspension 
of a driver’s license has a negative impact on employment). 
178 Frances Robles & Shaila Dewan, Skip Child Support. Go to Jail. Lose Job. Repeat., N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 19, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/20/us/skip-child-support-go-to-jail-lose-job-
repeat.html [https://perma.cc/2SWD-B4QZ]. 
179 ZATZ ET AL., supra note 149, at 2. 
180 Brayne, supra note 14, at 368. 
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and she argues that the rise in surveillance mechanisms related to criminal 
justice has led to a “concomitant increase in efforts to evade” that 
surveillance.181 Those with prior criminal law contact avoided institutions like 
schools, employers, or hospitals, but not community organizations that did not 
collect data, such as churches.182 Prior negative contact with the criminal 
justice system also diminishes other forms of social engagement. Sociologist 
and legal scholar Sara Greene found that prior encounters with the criminal 
justice system led to diminished engagement with the civil legal system, for 
instance, in the form of not seeking civil legal services.183 
System avoidance is harmful precisely because it deters so many socially 
useful interactions. Those who avoid access to recordkeeping institutions, such 
as banks, hospitals, or the police, are more likely to be at risk of crime or 
adverse health care outcomes. Communities as a whole are also less well off 
when large classes of people are unable to access medical care or report crime. 
Situating immigration enforcement in the context of other quasi-criminal 
enforcement mechanisms shows the reach of informal mechanisms of 
enforcement. In both systems, routine interactions with private and public 
actors can trigger escalated penalties. In the immigration context, as in the 
criminal law context, these dynamics constitute an important type of 
enforcement, even if it is not the most severe type of enforcement. Both 
systems create costs that emerge from power imbalances between the 
regulated population and other actors. 
The comparison to criminal law also reveals why escalated enforcement will 
not necessarily lead those present without authorization to make a rational 
decision to return to their country of origin. Those subject to ongoing surveillance 
and low-level criminal law enforcement do not systemically leave neighborhoods 
where they are disproportionately subject to police stops or nuisance enforcement. 
The costs of moving may be prohibitive or they may lack desirable options for 
relocation. Instead, some regulated populations avoid contact with surveilling 
institutions in order to minimize the likelihood of escalated enforcement. 
Criminal law comparisons also help to illuminate the costs of delegating 
enforcement discretion to a host of diﬀerent actors. This enforcement 
structure creates both incentives and opportunities for key actors to abuse 
their positions of power by engaging in discrimination or exploitation. In 
addition, even when enforcement agents do not seek to take advantage of 
vulnerable populations, awareness of surveillance and the possibility of 
enforcement can lead to outcomes like system avoidance. What matters are 
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183 Sara Sternberg Greene, Race, Class, and Access to Civil Justice, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1263, 1267 (2016). 
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the perceptions of how enforcement mechanisms work, not only how 
enforcement is actually exercised in any given case. 
IV. RESTRUCTURING IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT 
Immigration enforcement reaches well beyond those who are removed; it 
also aﬀects the vast majority who remain. It does so by creating or 
exacerbating structural power imbalances between undocumented migrants 
and others. Given these dynamics, how should enforcement unfold? 
This Part considers how to conduct immigration enforcement given that the 
vast majority of undocumented migrants will not be removed. It first evaluates 
the limits of procedural solutions and considers “sanctuary” policies as an attempt 
to ameliorate some of the costs of system avoidance. It then considers how to make 
interior immigration enforcement choices in light of the hidden costs of 
enforcement. It uses insights from misdemeanor reform to evaluate preliminarily 
how to better account for the costs of conducting interior enforcement. 
A. Procedural Remedies 
Procedural remedies—meaning remedies aimed at improving the process 
implemented in immigration courts—tend to loom large in immigration 
enforcement debates.184 That is because the procedures that accompany 
removal proceedings are grossly inadequate to their stated purpose. Children, 
for instance, appear without lawyers and represent themselves in immigration 
court.185 The majority of those who are formally removed never actually have 
the opportunity for adjudication before an immigration judge because their 
cases are disposed of in a variety of “summary” or “expedited” proceedings.186 
Noncitizens in criminal proceedings also face barriers to making fully 
informed plea agreements. Criminal defense attorneys are now required to 
inform defendants who are lawfully present if their pleas will trigger mandatory 
deportation.187 Yet there is no similar obligation for attorneys in the many cases 
where criminal pleas may potentially trigger deportation but deportation is not 
mandatory.188 Thus, in both criminal and in immigration proceedings, 
 
184 See, e.g., Koh, supra note 34, at 183 (discussing critiques of immigration court and noting that given 
the inadequate procedures in immigration adjudication, it “logically follows that the lion’s share of reform 
proposals have focused on improving the law, policies, and resources associated with the immigration courts”). 
185 Jerry Markon, Can a 3-Year Old Represent Herself in Immigration Court? This Judge Thinks So., 
WASH. POST (Mar. 5, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/can-a-3-year-
old-represent-herself-in-immigration-court-this-judge-thinks-so/2016/03/03/5be59a32-db25-11e5-925f-
1d10062cc82d_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.7b93383bb014 [https://perma.cc/EBD6-Z2KP]. 
186 See Koh, supra note 34, at 183-86 (noting that approximately half of removal orders were in absentia 
in 2015 and describing how “various enforcement measures . . . effectively bypass the immigration courts”). 
187 Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 360 (2010). 
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improved procedures—designed with the aim of ensuring that noncitizens have 
the opportunity for adjudication, access to counsel, information about their 
remedies, and translation services—can play an important role. Indeed, access 
to counsel itself makes a significant difference in the likelihood of removal.189 
Likewise, the ability to appear before a judge in person, as opposed to via 
remote adjudication, also appears to affect outcomes.190 
As valuable as improved procedures would be for those who are placed in 
removal proceedings, they would do relatively little work at the bottom of the 
immigration enforcement pyramid. Here, criminal cases are illustrative as 
well. Criminal procedure does considerably less work in the context of 
misdemeanors as compared to felonies. Due to well-documented funding 
deﬁcits for public defenders, long delays in misdemeanor courts, and steep 
collateral consequences triggered by arrest alone, criminal defendants often 
choose to waive all procedural rights and plead guilty.191 They also routinely 
do so without the knowledge that minor convictions can carry lasting 
penalties, such as by posing barriers to employment.192 
Procedural remedies—namely, adopting important criminal procedure 
protections in immigration proceedings—do not oﬀer a meaningful solution 
to the unintended consequences of interior immigration enforcement. The 
vast majority of undocumented migrants do not experience removal; what 
they instead experience is uncertainty about how and when immigration 
enforcement may unfold. Procedural protections can do little to address this 
type of uncertainty, particularly when undocumented migrants are aware that 
they run the risk of putting themselves on the radar for escalated immigration 
enforcement if they come forward and seek legal protections. Thus, while 
improved procedures could be valuable at the tip of the immigration 
 
189 Eagly & Shafer, supra note 33, at 9. 
190 Ingrid V. Eagly, Remote Adjudication in Immigration, 109 NW. L. REV. 933, 937 (2015). 
191 See MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN 
A LOWER CRIMINAL COURT 30-33 (1979) (explaining that the “process costs”—the hassle of being 
a defendant in misdemeanor court—outweigh the formal punishment); Albert W. 
Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant’s Right to Trial: Alternatives to the Plea Bargaining 
System, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 931, 953 (1983) (observing that “[a] misdemeanor defendant, even if 
innocent, usually is well advised to waive every available procedural protection (including the right 
to counsel) and to plead guilty at the earliest possible opportunity,” given that the perceived beneﬁts 
of an acquittal are outweighed by the costs of seeking adjudication); Joe, supra note 44, at 743 
(discussing funding shortages for public defenders). 
192 See, e.g., JAMES JACOBS, THE ETERNAL CRIMINAL RECORD 4 (2015) (“[C]riminal records 
today are widely used to assess, sort, and categorize people in such diverse contexts as immigration, 
employment, housing, university admissions, voting, possessing ﬁrearms, serving on a jury, and 
qualifying for social welfare beneﬁts.”); Benjamin Levin, Criminal Employment Law, 39 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 2265, 2267 (2018) (discussing how “criminal conviction, charge, and even arrest” can make 
it diﬃcult for individuals to “ﬁnd[] and keep[] a job”).  
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enforcement pyramid, they would have relatively little impact on the vast 
majority who remain present long-term. 
B. “Sanctuary” as a Managerial Strategy 
“Sanctuary” has become a ﬂashpoint in conversations about immigration 
reform. Some opponents depict sanctuary jurisdictions as soft on crime, while 
some proponents connect immigrant-protective policies to a principled 
opposition to deportation.193 In practice, sanctuary policies in criminal justice 
do not necessarily reﬂect a robust commitment to immigration expansionism 
or integration. While the substance of certain policies may well be motivated 
by a desire to welcome noncitizens, they should also be understood as an 
attempt to make policing decisions in a way that reﬂects law enforcement 
goals. As such, sanctuary policies with respect to criminal justice cannot be 
understood apart from underlying policing practices. 
“Sanctuary” is an imperfect umbrella term for a range of distinct 
approaches to immigration enforcement, including policies outside the 
context of law enforcement.194 Some policies prohibit police from inquiring 
about immigration status when it is unrelated to any suspected criminal 
violation.195 Other sanctuary policies govern information sharing with ICE, 
such as by prohibiting local law enforcement from sharing information about 
the timing of criminal case dispositions with ICE, restricting ICE access to 
local jails to conduct interviews, or otherwise limiting the conditions under 
which local police will comply with ICE detainer requests.196 The stated 
rationales for noncompliance also vary, and they range from the locality’s 
interest in welcoming immigrants to its interest in not paying for federal 
immigration enforcement eﬀorts.197 
 
193 See, e.g., Trevor George Gardner, Immigrant Sanctuary as the ‘Old Normal’; A Brief History of 
Police Federalism, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (2019) (collecting quotes from government oﬃcials 
criticizing sanctuary policies as a “gift” to gangs); Barbara E. Armacost, “Sanctuary” Laws: The New 
Immigration Federalism, 2016 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1197, 1199, 1205 (observing that the modern 
sanctuary movement diﬀers in important ways from its namesake in the church-led sanctuary 
movement of the 1980s). 
194 For recent contributions to the literature, see generally Armacost, supra note 193, at 1205; 
Ming H. Chen, Trust in Immigration Enforcement: State Noncooperation and Sanctuary Cities After 
Secure Communities, 91 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 13 (2016); Christopher N. Lasch et al., Understanding 
“Sanctuary Cities”, 59 B.C. L. REV. 1703 (2018); Hiroshi Motomura, Arguing About Sanctuary, 52 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 435, 437 (2018) (observing that “sanctuary has come to mean many things” and 
arguing that it is important to “distinguish decisions to intervene aﬃrmatively in immigration 
enforcement from decisions not to intervene aﬃrmatively but instead to decline involvement”). 
195 Lasch et al., supra note 194, at 1707. 
196 Id. 
197 Ingrid V. Eagly, Immigrant Protective Policies in Criminal Justice, 95 TEX. L. REV. 245, 288, 293 (2016). 
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Some sanctuary policies recognize that immigration enforcement does not 
take place in a vacuum; decisions by unauthorized migrants to avoid the 
police have feedback eﬀects on crime control.198 Police have reason to worry 
if policies deter the reporting of serious crimes and damage their 
relationships with policed communities.199 Consistent with this concern, 
some local prosecutors have stated that they will avoid prosecuting low-level 
cases that trigger disproportionate penalties.200 
In taking this approach, sanctuary policies are not unique to the 
immigration context. Some localities that have adopted immigrant-protective 
policies also take similar measures in other cases where low-level convictions 
trigger disproportionate consequences. For instance, prosecutors in some 
jurisdictions take a similar approach to minor convictions that have a direct 
impact on a defendant’s ability to work or go to school.201 
Sanctuary is thus partially an adaptive response to immigration 
enforcement decisions that cut against a law enforcement agency’s 
institutional interests. Law enforcement agencies that take this approach do 
not necessarily oppose immigration enforcement at large; rather, they oppose 
enforcement in a way that alters or undercuts their own objectives. 
Sanctuary policies hold promise in part because of the demographics of 
undocumented migration. Undocumented migrants are concentrated in 
particular localities in the United States. The majority of unauthorized 
residents live in six states and in twenty metropolitan areas.202 California alone 
is home to over two million unauthorized migrants.203 Sanctuary policies in 
areas with a relatively high concentration of undocumented migrants thus have 
 
198 See Orde F. Kittrie, Federalism, Deportation, and Crime Victims Afraid to Call the Police, 91 
IOWA L. REV. 1449, 1461 (2006) (discussing how the threat of deportation may prevent noncitizens 
from reporting crime). 
199 See Laura Sullivan, Police, Banks Help Undocumented Workers Shake ‘Walking ATM’ Label, 
NPR (Jan. 20, 2014), https://www.npr.org/2014/01/20/263505387/police-banks-help-undocumented-
workers-shake-walking-atm-label [https://perma.cc/SR9B-ECYZ] (reporting on the targeting of 
undocumented immigrants by thieves); see also Monica C. Bell, Police Reform and the Dismantling of 
Legal Estrangement, 126 YALE L.J. 2054 (2017) (discussing consequences of lack of trust in the police). 
200 Eagly, supra note 197, at 306; Jain, supra note 28, at 1219-20. 
201 Jain, supra note 28, at 1216. 
202 See Jeffrey S. Passel & D’Vera Cohn, 20 Metro Areas Are Home to Six-in-Ten Unauthorized 
Immigrants in U.S., PEW RES. CTR. (Feb. 9, 2017), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/02/09/us-
metro-areas-unauthorized-immigrants/ [https://perma.cc/V4JQ-554G] (noting that the New York and 
Los Angeles metro areas contain unauthorized immigrant populations of 1,200,000 and 1,000,000, 
respectively); U.S. Unauthorized Immigration Population Estimates, PEW RES. CTR. (Nov. 6, 2016), 
http://www.pewhispanic.org/interactives/unauthorized-immigrants/ [https://perma.cc/N8Q5-6G7Q] 
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203 See U.S. Unauthorized Immigration Population Estimates, supra note 202. 
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the potential to significantly impact how large portions of the undocumented 
population experience contact with the criminal justice system. 
As a regulatory strategy, however, sanctuary is imperfect. Sanctuary 
jurisdictions do not opt out of the ﬁngerprint sharing aspect of Secure 
Communities. Instead, they reduce the eﬃcacy of Secure Communities, such 
as by limiting communication with federal immigration enforcement oﬃcials 
and by refusing to honor federal detainer requests. They thus oﬀer no safe 
harbors from deportation. Sanctuary jurisdictions also exclude important 
categories of migrants from their policies. For instance, Chicago’s 
“Welcoming City” ordinance as a general matter prevents police from 
inquiring about immigration status, and it restricts information sharing with 
federal immigration enforcement oﬃcials.204 But there are important 
exceptions: the restrictions do not apply if the arrested individual has open 
arrests, prior felony convictions, or appears in a gang database.205 The 
exceptions are wide-ranging, and they also create uncertainty about who 
exactly is likely to be shielded. If undocumented migrants lack knowledge 
about the particulars of how sanctuary policies work, they may not view such 
policies as a meaningful intervention. 
More fundamentally, sanctuary also cannot be understood apart from 
underlying policing practices. Some police departments and local 
governments have identified themselves as adhering to “sanctuary” policies 
while at the same time pursuing policing practices that necessarily place a 
number of people on the radar for immigration enforcement. Police 
departments that make high-volume, low-level arrests in the context of public 
order policing necessarily conduct immigration screening on arrested 
individuals. For low-level offenses, ones that could be regulated by means 
other than criminal law, this raises the question: why arrest in the first place?206 
In addition, the expressive message of “sanctuary” may not carry much 
weight if communities view underlying policing practices themselves as 
unjustiﬁed. In jurisdictions such as Baltimore, New York, and Chicago, 
among others—those with a well-documented and recent history of police 
misconduct—sanctuary policies may do little on the ground given the history 
of distrust between communities and police.207 
 
204 CHI., ILL., CODE §§ 2-173-005, 2-173-020, 2-173-030 (2019). 
205 Id. at § 2-173-042. For a discussion about potential overbreadth with gang member 
provisions, see Chacón, supra note 97, at 320. 
206 Rachel A. Harmon, Why Arrest?, 115 MICH. L. REV. 307, 316-17 (2016). 
207 See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 299 F. Supp. 3d 976, 986 (N.D. Ill. 2018) (discussing federal 
officers conducting sting operations in Chicago as “adopt[ing] a narrative tinged with racial overtones”); 
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Finally, given that police are far from the only agents that act as 
immigration enforcers, sanctuary policies in criminal justice can only do so 
much. Rose Villazor and Pratheepan Gulasekaram discuss a more holistic 
approach of a “sanctuary network” where diﬀerent entities—local 
governments, universities, schools, police, or employers—work together to 
coordinate and apply sanctuary policies.208 Taking this approach oﬀers one 
potential, albeit imperfect, mechanism for reducing some of the undesired 
costs of immigration enforcement. 
C. Evaluating the Costs of Enforcement 
The current structure of immigration enforcement reflects the assumption 
that delegating enforcement discretion to public and private actors lowers the 
costs of enforcement. This assumption, however, may not hold true if the 
hidden costs of enforcement are also taken into account. In the low-level 
criminal law enforcement context, an important and growing body of work 
evaluates the full costs of seemingly minor contact with the criminal justice 
system, and it argues for a broader recognition of these difficult-to-quantify 
costs in criminal law enforcement decisions. This Section draws on 
misdemeanor reform as a model for assessing hidden costs relating to 
enforcement, including costs to private actors and to society at large. 
To be clear, cost–beneﬁt analysis is of course not the only factor that 
drives enforcement choices. Immigration enforcement choices should be 
guided by the substantive question of who ought to be recognized as a 
member. Immigration scholarship thus unsurprisingly tends to focus on 
membership theory.209 Immigration scholar Hiroshi Motomura employs the 
concept of “immigration as aﬃliation” to develop the argument that 
immigration law ought to recognize long-standing membership ties.210 In the 
context of “Dreamers,” Motomura writes that undocumented migrants are 
“already part of American society in many ways” given that they typically 
“arrived at a young age and in the distant past . . . [and have] had little or no 
contact with their parents’ countries of origin.”211 This theory of membership 
is grounded in a recognition of associational ties. Those who are here long-
term, who arrive as children, and who make important contributions to U.S. 
communities deserve to be put on a path to citizenship. 
 
minorities in cities disproportionately encounter police in both constitutional and unconstitutional 
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210 Motomura, Making Legal, supra note 138, at 1131. 
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Membership theory provides one argument for immigration reform—
speciﬁcally, a legalization program to recognize the status of certain 
undocumented migrants. A conceptually distinct argument, but one that 
leads to the same conclusion, relates to recognizing the full costs of 
enforcement. To the extent interior immigration enforcement has been 
driven by cost–beneﬁt analysis, it should at minimum take into account the 
full costs of enforcement. 
In the misdemeanor context, both substantive arguments about the proper 
scope of criminalization as well as a recognition of the full costs of 
enforcement have played a role in reform. Consider marijuana 
decriminalization: one substantive argument is that adult marijuana use, like 
adult alcohol use, is not the proper subject for criminal law enforcement. Yet 
another argument is that seemingly low-cost enforcement eﬀorts actually 
carry steep hidden costs.212 In a variety of contexts—marijuana reform, bail 
reform, and misdemeanor reform—some who might otherwise support 
criminalization have supported decriminalization in light of evidence that the 
full costs of low-level enforcement are too high.213 Similarly, recognizing the 
full costs of immigration enforcement is an important consideration when 
evaluating whether interior immigration enforcement actually meets its 
objectives. The costs of immigration enforcement are diﬃcult to quantify, but 
they reach well beyond just the costs of deportation. My aim here is to 
illuminate certain systemic costs and to set the stage for further work that 
considers these and other costs. 
One set of costs are the social costs relating to enforcement. System 
avoidance is pernicious because it can be far-reaching and long-lasting. The 
concern is not only that individuals who are subject to enforcement are 
unwilling to report crimes when victimized. Rather, disengagement with 
socially valuable institutions can go much deeper, and it can harm 
communities as a whole.214 
 
212 See, e.g., Douglas A. Berman, Leveraging Marijuana Reform to Enhance Expungement Practices, 
30 FED. SENT’G R. 305, 306-08 (2018) (summarizing a history of marijuana reform eﬀorts, including 
reforms driven by research showing that marijuana criminalization disproportionately harmed 
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213 For a discussion of misdemeanor decriminalization, as well as a discussion of the distinction 
between decriminalization and full legalization, see generally Alexandra Natapoﬀ, Misdemeanor 
Decriminalization, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1055 (2015). For a discussion of the hidden costs of bail, see 
Crystal S. Yang, Toward an Optimal Bail System, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1399, 1405-06 (2017), which 
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In the misdemeanor context, recent research shows that low-level policing 
practices exert a social cost in promoting segregation. In particular, the 
perception that African Americans are disproportionately likely to be arrested 
for low-level violations in predominantly white spaces plays a role in 
perpetrating residential segregation.215 Low-level policing practices in New 
York and Ferguson had a disproportionate impact on racial minorities who 
“were out of place: people who had crossed racial boundaries and entered 
places where other races or ethnicities were the dominant presence.”216 
Minorities, in turn, report avoiding places where they perceive a 
disproportionate risk of being stopped.217 
While this is an area ripe for further research, recent studies show a 
similar eﬀect by immigration enforcement in promoting patterns of 
residential segregation.218 A recent study in Dallas, Texas, found that 
undocumented families perceived primarily Latino neighborhoods as 
desirable due to the perception that Latinos could better “blend in” and avoid 
detection.219 Perceptions about immigration enforcement also led to 
reluctance to venture to unknown neighborhoods, and this reluctance 
extended to U.S. citizen children.220 
Interior immigration enforcement can also diminish the potential for 
integration and access to education. This trend is particularly signiﬁcant for 
children. A rising proportion of U.S. school children live in mixed 
immigration–status families. Approximately 3,900,000 students enrolled in 
public and private school in grades kindergarten through twelve—or slightly 
over seven percent of the total enrolled student population—have at least one 
undocumented parent.221 The vast majority of these students—3.2 million—
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are U.S. citizens.222 Thus, immigration enforcement policies that chill 
undocumented parents from venturing into diﬀerent neighborhoods can play 
a lasting role in diminishing integration and access to education. 
Interior immigration enforcement also creates signiﬁcant trauma. This is 
particularly acute for children who experience separation. Immigration 
enforcement decisions should take into account the long-term public health 
consequences of trauma or stress relating to enforcement.223 
System avoidance also chills contact with valuable institutions. This goes 
beyond disengagement with the police. It may also diminish contact with 
institutions like hospitals and banks.224 A recent empirical study of the impact 
of Secure Communities suggests similar spillover eﬀects of immigration 
enforcement on Hispanic-headed U.S. citizen families, ﬁnding that U.S. 
citizens were less likely to apply for certain public beneﬁts if they had family 
members who were undocumented and lived in an area where they perceived 
high levels of immigration enforcement activity.225 Some enforcement actions 
deter students from attending school after high proﬁle enforcement 
actions.226 Students who do attend school may become withdrawn from 
administrators and teachers if they are aware that information shared with 
school personnel may be shared with ICE.227 
Private actors and localities also bear costs related to enforcement. Some 
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because of the additional costs it imposes on localities.228 Some localities 
oppose undertaking immigration enforcement responsibilities because of the 
additional cost imposed.229 In addition to discrete financial costs, there are also 
less tangible financial costs within workplaces. Regardless of how any particular 
employer exercises immigration enforcement discretion, undocumented 
migrants have reason to view employers as surveilling institutions and to avoid 
engaging in activity that draws their attention. To the extent interior 
immigration enforcement is based on deterrence theory, it should take into 
account the full costs of these enforcement policies and evaluate whether the 
benefits are worth the costs. 
CONCLUSION 
Immigration enforcement in the interior is often conceptualized as a 
question of how to ﬁnd and deport undocumented migrants. Yet it is also 
about regulating a large population of long-term undocumented migrants, 
including in ways that have a powerful impact on their families, communities, 
and on access to key legal institutions. These decisions reshape power 
dynamics in far-reaching ways. In the past two decades, immigration 
enforcement has rapidly expanded and delegated enforcement discretion to a 
host of diﬀerent actors, including both public and private enforcement agents, 
without fully appreciating the impact of this approach. 
Insights from low-level criminal enforcement show that this type of 
enforcement delegation can be costly: it can create law enforcement tradeoﬀs 
and lead to system avoidance. While this approach increases the number of 
actors who can detect undocumented migrants, it also creates hidden costs. 
Attention to the parallels between low-level criminal law enforcement and 
immigration enforcement oﬀers a way to begin recognizing and evaluating 
the full costs of interior immigration enforcement—costs that may be 
rendered invisible by a focus on deportation alone. 
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